| 1 | //! Tool specification traits for the CodeWhale agent system. |
| 2 | //! |
| 3 | //! This module defines the core abstractions for tools: |
| 4 | //! - `ToolSpec`: The main trait that all tools must implement |
| 5 | //! - `ToolContext`: Execution context passed to tools |
| 6 | //! - `ToolResult`: Unified result type for tool execution |
| 7 | //! - `ToolCapability`: Capabilities and requirements of tools |
| 8 | |
| 9 | use std::collections::HashMap; |
| 10 | use std::fs; |
| 11 | use std::path::{Component, Path, PathBuf}; |
| 12 | use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, OnceLock}; |
| 13 | use std::time::SystemTime; |
| 14 | |
| 15 | use async_trait::async_trait; |
| 16 | use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; |
| 17 | use serde_json::Value; |
| 18 | use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken; |
| 19 | use unicode_normalization::UnicodeNormalization; |
| 20 | |
| 21 | use codewhale_execpolicy::ApprovalMode; |
| 22 | |
| 23 | use crate::features::Features; |
| 24 | use crate::lsp::LspManager; |
| 25 | use crate::network_policy::NetworkPolicyDecider; |
| 26 | use crate::rlm::session::SessionObjectSnapshot; |
| 27 | use crate::rlm::session::{SharedRlmSessionStore, new_shared_rlm_session_store}; |
| 28 | use crate::sandbox::backend::SandboxBackend; |
| 29 | use crate::tools::handle::{SharedHandleStore, new_shared_handle_store}; |
| 30 | use crate::tools::shell::{SharedShellManager, new_shared_shell_manager}; |
| 31 | use crate::worker_profile::ShellPolicy; |
| 32 | #[allow(unused_imports)] |
| 33 | pub use codewhale_tools::{ |
| 34 | ApprovalRequirement, PreparedToolCall, ResourceClaim, ToolCapability, ToolError, |
| 35 | ToolExecutionOutcome, ToolResult, ToolResultContentBlock, ToolTerminalStatus, optional_bool, |
| 36 | optional_bool_opt, optional_str, optional_u64, required_str, required_u64, |
| 37 | schedule_non_conflicting, type_mismatch, |
| 38 | }; |
| 39 | |
| 40 | /// Text plus provider-neutral rich blocks at the conversation boundary. |
| 41 | #[derive(Debug, Clone)] |
| 42 | pub(crate) struct RichToolResult { |
| 43 | pub result: ToolResult, |
| 44 | pub content_blocks: Vec<ToolResultContentBlock>, |
| 45 | } |
| 46 | |
| 47 | impl RichToolResult { |
| 48 | #[must_use] |
| 49 | pub fn plain(result: ToolResult) -> Self { |
| 50 | Self { |
| 51 | result, |
| 52 | content_blocks: Vec::new(), |
| 53 | } |
| 54 | } |
| 55 | |
| 56 | #[must_use] |
| 57 | pub fn with_content_blocks( |
| 58 | result: ToolResult, |
| 59 | content_blocks: Vec<ToolResultContentBlock>, |
| 60 | ) -> Self { |
| 61 | Self { |
| 62 | result, |
| 63 | content_blocks, |
| 64 | } |
| 65 | } |
| 66 | |
| 67 | #[must_use] |
| 68 | pub fn into_result(self) -> ToolResult { |
| 69 | self.result |
| 70 | } |
| 71 | } |
| 72 | |
| 73 | impl std::ops::Deref for RichToolResult { |
| 74 | type Target = ToolResult; |
| 75 | |
| 76 | fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { |
| 77 | &self.result |
| 78 | } |
| 79 | } |
| 80 | |
| 81 | #[async_trait] |
| 82 | pub trait DynamicToolExecutor: Send + Sync { |
| 83 | async fn execute_dynamic_tool( |
| 84 | &self, |
| 85 | thread_id: Option<String>, |
| 86 | namespace: Option<String>, |
| 87 | name: String, |
| 88 | input: Value, |
| 89 | ) -> Result<ToolResult, ToolError>; |
| 90 | } |
| 91 | |
| 92 | /// Optional durable runtime services made available to model-visible tools. |
| 93 | /// |
| 94 | /// These are intentionally optional so existing unit tests and one-off tool |
| 95 | /// contexts keep working. Tools that need durable task/automation state fail |
| 96 | /// closed with a clear "not available" error when the relevant service is not |
| 97 | /// attached. |
| 98 | #[derive(Clone)] |
| 99 | pub struct RuntimeToolServices { |
| 100 | pub shell_manager: Option<SharedShellManager>, |
| 101 | /// True only for the real headless exec host after it has established the |
| 102 | /// explicit authority required to transfer `persist:true` services. |
| 103 | pub persist_services_enabled: bool, |
| 104 | pub task_manager: Option<crate::task_manager::SharedTaskManager>, |
| 105 | pub automations: Option<crate::automation_manager::SharedAutomationManager>, |
| 106 | pub task_data_dir: Option<PathBuf>, |
| 107 | pub active_task_id: Option<String>, |
| 108 | pub active_thread_id: Option<String>, |
| 109 | pub dynamic_tool_executor: Option<Arc<dyn DynamicToolExecutor>>, |
| 110 | /// Active-session Work Graph authority plus its legacy Plan/To-do views. |
| 111 | pub work: Option<crate::work_graph::SharedWorkRuntime>, |
| 112 | /// Hook executor for `shell_env` injection (#456) and any future |
| 113 | /// tool-side hook events. `None` outside the live engine — test |
| 114 | /// contexts that don't care about hooks get a no-op. |
| 115 | pub hook_executor: Option<std::sync::Arc<crate::hooks::HookExecutor>>, |
| 116 | /// Per-session backing store for `var_handle` payloads. Cloned tool |
| 117 | /// contexts share this Arc so handles survive across turns. |
| 118 | pub handle_store: SharedHandleStore, |
| 119 | /// Per-session persistent RLM kernels, keyed by caller-chosen context name. |
| 120 | pub rlm_sessions: SharedRlmSessionStore, |
| 121 | /// Directory for `read_media`'s content-addressed store of |
| 122 | /// pre-compression image originals. `None` (tests and one-off contexts) |
| 123 | /// disables persistence so unit tests never touch the real state dir; |
| 124 | /// production wiring points it at `<codewhale home>/media-originals`. |
| 125 | pub media_originals_dir: Option<PathBuf>, |
| 126 | } |
| 127 | |
| 128 | impl Default for RuntimeToolServices { |
| 129 | fn default() -> Self { |
| 130 | Self { |
| 131 | shell_manager: None, |
| 132 | persist_services_enabled: false, |
| 133 | task_manager: None, |
| 134 | automations: None, |
| 135 | task_data_dir: None, |
| 136 | active_task_id: None, |
| 137 | active_thread_id: None, |
| 138 | dynamic_tool_executor: None, |
| 139 | work: None, |
| 140 | hook_executor: None, |
| 141 | handle_store: new_shared_handle_store(), |
| 142 | rlm_sessions: new_shared_rlm_session_store(), |
| 143 | media_originals_dir: None, |
| 144 | } |
| 145 | } |
| 146 | } |
| 147 | |
| 148 | impl std::fmt::Debug for RuntimeToolServices { |
| 149 | fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { |
| 150 | f.debug_struct("RuntimeToolServices") |
| 151 | .field("shell_manager", &self.shell_manager.is_some()) |
| 152 | .field("persist_services_enabled", &self.persist_services_enabled) |
| 153 | .field("task_manager", &self.task_manager.is_some()) |
| 154 | .field("automations", &self.automations.is_some()) |
| 155 | .field("task_data_dir", &self.task_data_dir) |
| 156 | .field("active_task_id", &self.active_task_id) |
| 157 | .field("active_thread_id", &self.active_thread_id) |
| 158 | .field( |
| 159 | "dynamic_tool_executor", |
| 160 | &self.dynamic_tool_executor.is_some(), |
| 161 | ) |
| 162 | .field("work", &self.work.is_some()) |
| 163 | .field("hook_executor", &self.hook_executor.is_some()) |
| 164 | .field("handle_store", &true) |
| 165 | .field("rlm_sessions", &true) |
| 166 | .field("media_originals_dir", &self.media_originals_dir) |
| 167 | .finish() |
| 168 | } |
| 169 | } |
| 170 | |
| 171 | #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] |
| 172 | struct FileReadSnapshot { |
| 173 | len: u64, |
| 174 | modified: Option<SystemTime>, |
| 175 | } |
| 176 | |
| 177 | #[derive(Debug, Default)] |
| 178 | pub struct FileReadTracker { |
| 179 | reads: HashMap<PathBuf, FileReadSnapshot>, |
| 180 | } |
| 181 | |
| 182 | pub type SharedFileReadTracker = Arc<Mutex<FileReadTracker>>; |
| 183 | |
| 184 | pub(crate) fn new_shared_file_read_tracker() -> SharedFileReadTracker { |
| 185 | Arc::new(Mutex::new(FileReadTracker::default())) |
| 186 | } |
| 187 | |
| 188 | fn file_read_snapshot(path: &Path) -> Result<FileReadSnapshot, ToolError> { |
| 189 | let metadata = fs::metadata(path).map_err(|e| { |
| 190 | ToolError::execution_failed(format!("Failed to inspect {}: {e}", path.display())) |
| 191 | })?; |
| 192 | Ok(FileReadSnapshot { |
| 193 | len: metadata.len(), |
| 194 | modified: metadata.modified().ok(), |
| 195 | }) |
| 196 | } |
| 197 | |
| 198 | /// Sandbox policy for command execution. |
| 199 | #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)] |
| 200 | pub enum SandboxPolicy { |
| 201 | /// No sandboxing (dangerous but sometimes needed) |
| 202 | #[default] |
| 203 | None, |
| 204 | } |
| 205 | |
| 206 | /// Machine-readable mutation boundary for a headless worker process. |
| 207 | /// |
| 208 | /// Fleet serializes this envelope onto the exact `codewhale exec` argv. The |
| 209 | /// child installs it before constructing its engine, and every ToolContext in |
| 210 | /// that process inherits the same outer cap. Nested agents may narrow this |
| 211 | /// boundary, but cannot remove or expand it. |
| 212 | #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 213 | #[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] |
| 214 | pub struct ToolAuthorityEnvelope { |
| 215 | pub schema_version: u32, |
| 216 | pub owner: String, |
| 217 | pub authority: ToolMutationAuthority, |
| 218 | /// Optional outer network cap for headless workers. `None` preserves the |
| 219 | /// behavior of v1 envelopes written before this field existed; new Fleet |
| 220 | /// launches always carry the resolved worker permission explicitly. |
| 221 | #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] |
| 222 | pub network_access: Option<bool>, |
| 223 | /// Explicit shell cap for a headless worker. Older v1 envelopes omit this |
| 224 | /// field and therefore remain shell-less; mutation authority is never |
| 225 | /// treated as an implicit shell grant. |
| 226 | #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "ToolShellAuthority::is_none")] |
| 227 | pub shell: ToolShellAuthority, |
| 228 | /// Narrow process-start authority for the built-in verification surface. |
| 229 | /// This is separate from both mutation and shell authority: a verifier may |
| 230 | /// run classifier-bounded workspace checks, but that never grants Bash or |
| 231 | /// an operator-supplied command line. |
| 232 | #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "ToolVerificationAuthority::is_none")] |
| 233 | pub verification: ToolVerificationAuthority, |
| 234 | #[serde(default)] |
| 235 | pub writable_roots: Vec<String>, |
| 236 | #[serde(default)] |
| 237 | pub writable_files: Vec<String>, |
| 238 | #[serde(default)] |
| 239 | pub coordination_contracts: Vec<String>, |
| 240 | } |
| 241 | |
| 242 | /// Shell authority carried across the Fleet subprocess boundary. |
| 243 | /// |
| 244 | /// Full/arbitrary shell is intentionally not representable here. Fleet can |
| 245 | /// opt a Scout/Reviewer worker into the classifier-proven read subset, while every |
| 246 | /// other headless role keeps the historical shell-less posture. |
| 247 | #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 248 | #[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")] |
| 249 | pub enum ToolShellAuthority { |
| 250 | #[default] |
| 251 | None, |
| 252 | ReadOnly, |
| 253 | } |
| 254 | |
| 255 | impl ToolShellAuthority { |
| 256 | #[must_use] |
| 257 | pub const fn is_none(&self) -> bool { |
| 258 | matches!(self, Self::None) |
| 259 | } |
| 260 | |
| 261 | #[must_use] |
| 262 | const fn shell_policy(self) -> ShellPolicy { |
| 263 | match self { |
| 264 | Self::None => ShellPolicy::None, |
| 265 | Self::ReadOnly => ShellPolicy::ReadOnly, |
| 266 | } |
| 267 | } |
| 268 | } |
| 269 | |
| 270 | /// Process authority for Fleet's dedicated verifier role. |
| 271 | /// |
| 272 | /// Arbitrary execution is intentionally not representable. The registry and |
| 273 | /// dispatch boundary admit only calls that the shared verification classifier |
| 274 | /// proves are default workspace checks or pure test selection. |
| 275 | #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 276 | #[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")] |
| 277 | pub enum ToolVerificationAuthority { |
| 278 | #[default] |
| 279 | None, |
| 280 | Bounded, |
| 281 | } |
| 282 | |
| 283 | impl ToolVerificationAuthority { |
| 284 | #[must_use] |
| 285 | pub const fn is_none(&self) -> bool { |
| 286 | matches!(self, Self::None) |
| 287 | } |
| 288 | } |
| 289 | |
| 290 | /// Whether a headless Fleet process should register the one read-only Bash |
| 291 | /// surface after intersecting the transported cap with explicit tool denies. |
| 292 | #[must_use] |
| 293 | pub(crate) fn fleet_exec_shell_enabled( |
| 294 | fleet_authority_active: bool, |
| 295 | shell_authority: ToolShellAuthority, |
| 296 | disallowed_tools: Option<&[String]>, |
| 297 | ) -> bool { |
| 298 | fleet_authority_active |
| 299 | && shell_authority == ToolShellAuthority::ReadOnly |
| 300 | && !disallowed_tools.is_some_and(|rules| { |
| 301 | rules.iter().any(|rule| { |
| 302 | let rule = rule.trim().to_ascii_lowercase(); |
| 303 | rule.strip_suffix('*') |
| 304 | .map_or_else(|| rule == "bash", |prefix| "bash".starts_with(prefix)) |
| 305 | }) |
| 306 | }) |
| 307 | } |
| 308 | |
| 309 | #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)] |
| 310 | #[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")] |
| 311 | pub enum ToolMutationAuthority { |
| 312 | ReadOnly, |
| 313 | ScopedWrite, |
| 314 | } |
| 315 | |
| 316 | static PROCESS_TOOL_AUTHORITY: OnceLock<Arc<ToolAuthorityEnvelope>> = OnceLock::new(); |
| 317 | |
| 318 | impl ToolAuthorityEnvelope { |
| 319 | pub fn normalized(mut self) -> Result<Self, String> { |
| 320 | if self.schema_version != 1 { |
| 321 | return Err(format!( |
| 322 | "unsupported tool authority schema version {}", |
| 323 | self.schema_version |
| 324 | )); |
| 325 | } |
| 326 | self.owner = bounded_authority_value("owner", &self.owner, 128)?; |
| 327 | self.writable_roots = normalize_authority_paths(&self.writable_roots, "writable_roots")?; |
| 328 | self.writable_files = normalize_authority_paths(&self.writable_files, "writable_files")?; |
| 329 | self.coordination_contracts = normalize_authority_values( |
| 330 | &self.coordination_contracts, |
| 331 | "coordination_contracts", |
| 332 | 16, |
| 333 | 128, |
| 334 | )?; |
| 335 | if self.authority == ToolMutationAuthority::ScopedWrite |
| 336 | && self.writable_roots.is_empty() |
| 337 | && self.writable_files.is_empty() |
| 338 | && self.coordination_contracts.is_empty() |
| 339 | { |
| 340 | return Err( |
| 341 | "scoped_write authority requires a writable root, exact file, or coordination contract" |
| 342 | .to_string(), |
| 343 | ); |
| 344 | } |
| 345 | if self.authority == ToolMutationAuthority::ReadOnly |
| 346 | && (!self.writable_roots.is_empty() |
| 347 | || !self.writable_files.is_empty() |
| 348 | || !self.coordination_contracts.is_empty()) |
| 349 | { |
| 350 | return Err("read_only authority cannot carry mutation scope".to_string()); |
| 351 | } |
| 352 | if self.verification == ToolVerificationAuthority::Bounded |
| 353 | && (self.authority != ToolMutationAuthority::ReadOnly |
| 354 | || self.shell != ToolShellAuthority::None) |
| 355 | { |
| 356 | return Err( |
| 357 | "bounded verification requires read_only mutation authority and no Bash authority" |
| 358 | .to_string(), |
| 359 | ); |
| 360 | } |
| 361 | Ok(self) |
| 362 | } |
| 363 | |
| 364 | pub fn from_json(raw: &str) -> Result<Self, String> { |
| 365 | serde_json::from_str::<Self>(raw) |
| 366 | .map_err(|error| format!("invalid tool authority envelope: {error}"))? |
| 367 | .normalized() |
| 368 | } |
| 369 | |
| 370 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 371 | fn is_within(&self, outer: &Self) -> bool { |
| 372 | if self.shell > outer.shell |
| 373 | || self.verification > outer.verification |
| 374 | || (outer.network_access == Some(false) && self.network_access != Some(false)) |
| 375 | { |
| 376 | return false; |
| 377 | } |
| 378 | if self.authority == ToolMutationAuthority::ReadOnly { |
| 379 | return true; |
| 380 | } |
| 381 | if outer.authority != ToolMutationAuthority::ScopedWrite { |
| 382 | return false; |
| 383 | } |
| 384 | self.writable_roots.iter().all(|path| { |
| 385 | outer |
| 386 | .writable_roots |
| 387 | .iter() |
| 388 | .any(|root| authority_path_is_within_root(path, root)) |
| 389 | }) && self.writable_files.iter().all(|path| { |
| 390 | outer.writable_files.contains(path) |
| 391 | || outer |
| 392 | .writable_roots |
| 393 | .iter() |
| 394 | .any(|root| authority_path_is_within_root(path, root)) |
| 395 | }) && self |
| 396 | .coordination_contracts |
| 397 | .iter() |
| 398 | .all(|contract| outer.coordination_contracts.contains(contract)) |
| 399 | } |
| 400 | |
| 401 | pub fn permits_mutation_path( |
| 402 | &self, |
| 403 | context: &ToolContext, |
| 404 | raw_path: &str, |
| 405 | ) -> Result<bool, ToolError> { |
| 406 | if self.authority == ToolMutationAuthority::ReadOnly { |
| 407 | return Ok(false); |
| 408 | } |
| 409 | let target = resolve_strict_authority_path(context, raw_path)?; |
| 410 | for file in &self.writable_files { |
| 411 | if resolve_strict_authority_path(context, file)? == target { |
| 412 | return Ok(true); |
| 413 | } |
| 414 | } |
| 415 | for root in &self.writable_roots { |
| 416 | if target.starts_with(resolve_strict_authority_path(context, root)?) { |
| 417 | return Ok(true); |
| 418 | } |
| 419 | } |
| 420 | Ok(false) |
| 421 | } |
| 422 | } |
| 423 | |
| 424 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 425 | fn authority_path_is_within_root(path: &str, root: &str) -> bool { |
| 426 | root == "." |
| 427 | || path == root |
| 428 | || path |
| 429 | .strip_prefix(root) |
| 430 | .is_some_and(|suffix| suffix.starts_with('/')) |
| 431 | } |
| 432 | |
| 433 | pub fn install_process_tool_authority(envelope: ToolAuthorityEnvelope) -> Result<(), String> { |
| 434 | let envelope = Arc::new(envelope.normalized()?); |
| 435 | if let Some(existing) = PROCESS_TOOL_AUTHORITY.get() { |
| 436 | return if existing.as_ref() == envelope.as_ref() { |
| 437 | Ok(()) |
| 438 | } else { |
| 439 | Err("tool authority envelope was already installed for this process".to_string()) |
| 440 | }; |
| 441 | } |
| 442 | PROCESS_TOOL_AUTHORITY |
| 443 | .set(envelope) |
| 444 | .map_err(|_| "tool authority envelope was already installed for this process".to_string()) |
| 445 | } |
| 446 | |
| 447 | fn process_tool_authority() -> Option<Arc<ToolAuthorityEnvelope>> { |
| 448 | PROCESS_TOOL_AUTHORITY.get().cloned() |
| 449 | } |
| 450 | |
| 451 | fn bounded_authority_value(field: &str, value: &str, max_chars: usize) -> Result<String, String> { |
| 452 | let value = value.trim().nfc().collect::<String>(); |
| 453 | if value.is_empty() |
| 454 | || value.chars().count() > max_chars |
| 455 | || value.chars().any(|ch| matches!(ch, '\0' | '\r' | '\n')) |
| 456 | { |
| 457 | return Err(format!( |
| 458 | "tool authority {field} must be one non-empty line of at most {max_chars} characters" |
| 459 | )); |
| 460 | } |
| 461 | Ok(value) |
| 462 | } |
| 463 | |
| 464 | fn normalize_authority_paths(values: &[String], field: &str) -> Result<Vec<String>, String> { |
| 465 | if values.len() > 32 { |
| 466 | return Err(format!("tool authority {field} accepts at most 32 entries")); |
| 467 | } |
| 468 | let mut normalized = Vec::new(); |
| 469 | for raw in values { |
| 470 | let raw = bounded_authority_value(field, raw, 512)?.replace('\\', "/"); |
| 471 | let windows_drive = raw.as_bytes().get(1) == Some(&b':') |
| 472 | && raw.as_bytes().first().is_some_and(u8::is_ascii_alphabetic); |
| 473 | if raw.starts_with('/') || raw.starts_with("//") || windows_drive { |
| 474 | return Err(format!( |
| 475 | "tool authority {field} entries must be repo-relative" |
| 476 | )); |
| 477 | } |
| 478 | let mut segments = Vec::new(); |
| 479 | for segment in raw.split('/') { |
| 480 | match segment { |
| 481 | "" | "." => {} |
| 482 | ".." => { |
| 483 | return Err(format!( |
| 484 | "tool authority {field} cannot contain parent traversal" |
| 485 | )); |
| 486 | } |
| 487 | value => segments.push(value), |
| 488 | } |
| 489 | } |
| 490 | let path = if segments.is_empty() { |
| 491 | ".".to_string() |
| 492 | } else { |
| 493 | segments.join("/") |
| 494 | }; |
| 495 | if !normalized.contains(&path) { |
| 496 | normalized.push(path); |
| 497 | } |
| 498 | } |
| 499 | Ok(normalized) |
| 500 | } |
| 501 | |
| 502 | fn normalize_authority_values( |
| 503 | values: &[String], |
| 504 | field: &str, |
| 505 | max_entries: usize, |
| 506 | max_chars: usize, |
| 507 | ) -> Result<Vec<String>, String> { |
| 508 | if values.len() > max_entries { |
| 509 | return Err(format!( |
| 510 | "tool authority {field} accepts at most {max_entries} entries" |
| 511 | )); |
| 512 | } |
| 513 | let mut normalized = Vec::new(); |
| 514 | for value in values { |
| 515 | let value = bounded_authority_value(field, value, max_chars)?; |
| 516 | if !normalized.contains(&value) { |
| 517 | normalized.push(value); |
| 518 | } |
| 519 | } |
| 520 | Ok(normalized) |
| 521 | } |
| 522 | |
| 523 | pub(crate) fn resolve_strict_authority_path( |
| 524 | context: &ToolContext, |
| 525 | raw_path: &str, |
| 526 | ) -> Result<PathBuf, ToolError> { |
| 527 | let normalized = normalize_authority_paths(&[raw_path.to_string()], "mutation_path") |
| 528 | .map_err(ToolError::permission_denied)? |
| 529 | .into_iter() |
| 530 | .next() |
| 531 | .ok_or_else(|| ToolError::permission_denied("mutation path cannot be empty"))?; |
| 532 | let workspace = context.workspace.canonicalize().map_err(|error| { |
| 533 | ToolError::execution_failed(format!( |
| 534 | "Failed to canonicalize authority workspace {}: {error}", |
| 535 | context.workspace.display() |
| 536 | )) |
| 537 | })?; |
| 538 | let mut current = workspace.clone(); |
| 539 | if normalized != "." { |
| 540 | for segment in normalized.split('/') { |
| 541 | current.push(segment); |
| 542 | match fs::symlink_metadata(¤t) { |
| 543 | Ok(metadata) if metadata.file_type().is_symlink() => { |
| 544 | return Err(ToolError::permission_denied(format!( |
| 545 | "machine-readable authority paths must not traverse symlinks: {}", |
| 546 | current.display() |
| 547 | ))); |
| 548 | } |
| 549 | Ok(_) => {} |
| 550 | Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {} |
| 551 | Err(error) => { |
| 552 | return Err(ToolError::execution_failed(format!( |
| 553 | "Failed to inspect authority path {}: {error}", |
| 554 | current.display() |
| 555 | ))); |
| 556 | } |
| 557 | } |
| 558 | } |
| 559 | } |
| 560 | if !current.starts_with(&workspace) { |
| 561 | return Err(ToolError::permission_denied(format!( |
| 562 | "machine-readable authority path escapes workspace: {}", |
| 563 | current.display() |
| 564 | ))); |
| 565 | } |
| 566 | Ok(current) |
| 567 | } |
| 568 | |
| 569 | /// Context passed to tools during execution. |
| 570 | #[derive(Clone)] |
| 571 | pub struct ToolContext { |
| 572 | /// The workspace root directory |
| 573 | pub workspace: PathBuf, |
| 574 | /// Per-turn policy and attached services. Kept behind one owned group so |
| 575 | /// cloning a context preserves the historical value semantics while the |
| 576 | /// top-level context remains small and stable as services evolve. |
| 577 | pub execution: Box<ToolExecutionState>, |
| 578 | } |
| 579 | |
| 580 | /// Policy and service state attached to one tool-execution context. |
| 581 | /// |
| 582 | /// `ToolContext` dereferences to this group for source compatibility with |
| 583 | /// existing tools. New code can use `context.execution` when the grouping is |
| 584 | /// useful, without growing the top-level context by another field per feature. |
| 585 | #[derive(Clone)] |
| 586 | pub struct ToolExecutionState { |
| 587 | /// Actual Core caller admission for per-round Python RPCs. Kernels do not |
| 588 | /// retain it; unattached tool contexts cannot make model calls. |
| 589 | pub(crate) rlm_caller: Option<Arc<crate::core::engine::rlm_host::CapturedRlmCaller>>, |
| 590 | /// Effective session/ancestor tool ceiling, carried to MCP dispatch and runtime registration. |
| 591 | pub(crate) disallowed_tools: Vec<String>, |
| 592 | /// Trusted local host narrowing; inherited by every alias/nested context. |
| 593 | pub(crate) acp_host: Option<codewhale_config::AppMode>, |
| 594 | /// Captured child grant; retained through aliases and context overrides. |
| 595 | pub(crate) child_host: Option<Arc<crate::tools::subagent::engine::ChildAuthority>>, |
| 596 | /// Set only on the context of one call a person approved on a card. |
| 597 | pub(crate) human_decision: Option<crate::core::engine::HumanDecision>, |
| 598 | /// Shared shell manager for background tasks and streaming IO. |
| 599 | pub shell_manager: SharedShellManager, |
| 600 | /// Per-session snapshots for files successfully observed by `read_file`. |
| 601 | /// Mutation tools use this to reject narrow edits against unread or stale |
| 602 | /// content. |
| 603 | pub file_read_tracker: SharedFileReadTracker, |
| 604 | /// Sub-agent that owns tool work started through this context. Root user |
| 605 | /// turns leave this unset; child contexts stamp it so long-running shell |
| 606 | /// jobs can be attributed in UI surfaces. |
| 607 | pub owner_agent_id: Option<String>, |
| 608 | pub owner_agent_name: Option<String>, |
| 609 | /// Tool call and engine turn that created long-running work through this |
| 610 | /// context. Hosts use these stable identities to reconcile later updates |
| 611 | /// with the originating transcript position. |
| 612 | pub(crate) origin_tool_call_id: Option<String>, |
| 613 | pub(crate) origin_turn_id: Option<String>, |
| 614 | /// Outer process authority cap installed by Fleet/headless dispatch. |
| 615 | /// `None` for ordinary interactive/root sessions. |
| 616 | pub(crate) tool_authority: Option<Arc<ToolAuthorityEnvelope>>, |
| 617 | /// Whether to allow paths outside workspace |
| 618 | pub trust_mode: bool, |
| 619 | /// Current sandbox policy |
| 620 | #[expect(dead_code)] |
| 621 | pub sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy, |
| 622 | /// Path for notes file |
| 623 | pub notes_path: PathBuf, |
| 624 | /// MCP configuration path |
| 625 | #[expect(dead_code)] |
| 626 | pub mcp_config_path: PathBuf, |
| 627 | /// Explicit skills directory used for model-visible skill discovery. |
| 628 | pub skills_dir: Option<PathBuf>, |
| 629 | /// Restrict skill discovery to CodeWhale-owned roots plus `skills_dir`. |
| 630 | pub skills_discovery_mode: crate::skills::SkillDiscoveryMode, |
| 631 | /// Immutable registry snapshot for this workspace/engine context. |
| 632 | pub plugin_registry: Option<Arc<crate::plugins::PluginRegistry>>, |
| 633 | /// Elevated sandbox policy override (used when retrying after sandbox denial). |
| 634 | /// This overrides the default sandbox behavior for shell commands. |
| 635 | pub elevated_sandbox_policy: Option<crate::sandbox::SandboxPolicy>, |
| 636 | /// Whether the enclosing host is the real headless `codewhale exec` |
| 637 | /// process. `persist:true` background services are only permitted there; |
| 638 | /// interactive TUI, desktop/app-server, and hosted runtime-thread engines |
| 639 | /// leave this false so the feature fails closed. |
| 640 | pub persist_services_enabled: bool, |
| 641 | /// Optional user-facing hint for shell commands that fail because the |
| 642 | /// active sandbox policy intentionally denies outbound network access. |
| 643 | pub shell_network_denied_hint: Option<String>, |
| 644 | /// Whether tools should auto-approve without safety checks (YOLO mode). |
| 645 | /// When true, command safety analysis is skipped for shell execution. |
| 646 | pub auto_approve: bool, |
| 647 | /// Effective approval posture for this execution context. A turn stamps the |
| 648 | /// posture it resolved here; a context built from the legacy bit alone |
| 649 | /// folds it with [`crate::core::authority::posture_from_auto_approve`]. |
| 650 | /// Tools that create work of their own (a durable task) pin it, so the work |
| 651 | /// inherits the authority the caller was granted rather than re-deriving |
| 652 | /// one from a legacy bit. |
| 653 | pub approval_mode: ApprovalMode, |
| 654 | /// Effective shell policy for this execution context. |
| 655 | pub shell_policy: ShellPolicy, |
| 656 | /// Effective feature flag set for the running session. |
| 657 | pub features: Features, |
| 658 | /// Namespace for tool state that should be scoped to the current session/thread. |
| 659 | pub state_namespace: String, |
| 660 | /// Effective context window for the active provider/model route. Web tools |
| 661 | /// use this to keep inline page content below three percent of the route. |
| 662 | pub route_context_window: Option<u32>, |
| 663 | /// User-trusted external paths the agent may read/write even when they |
| 664 | /// fall outside `workspace`. Loaded from `~/.deepseek/workspace-trust.json` |
| 665 | /// and refreshed when the user runs `/trust add <path>`. Distinct from |
| 666 | /// `trust_mode`, which is the all-or-nothing legacy switch (#29). |
| 667 | pub trusted_external_paths: Vec<PathBuf>, |
| 668 | /// Whether to follow symbolic links during file discovery and tool |
| 669 | /// operations. When `true`, symlinked directories are traversed and |
| 670 | /// symlinked paths that resolve outside the workspace are still allowed |
| 671 | /// (the symlink itself must be inside the workspace). Mirrors the |
| 672 | /// `workspace_follow_symlinks` setting. |
| 673 | pub follow_symlinks: bool, |
| 674 | /// Per-domain network policy (#135). When `None`, network tools fall back |
| 675 | /// to a permissive default that mirrors pre-v0.7.0 behavior so tests and |
| 676 | /// other contexts that don't construct a real policy keep working. |
| 677 | pub network_policy: Option<NetworkPolicyDecider>, |
| 678 | /// Durable runtime services for task, gate, PR-attempt, GitHub evidence, |
| 679 | /// and automation tools. |
| 680 | pub runtime: RuntimeToolServices, |
| 681 | /// Snapshot of the active prompt/session/history exposed as symbolic RLM |
| 682 | /// objects. Tools only receive compact cards unless explicitly opening a |
| 683 | /// bounded object through `rlm_open`. |
| 684 | pub session_objects: Option<SessionObjectSnapshot>, |
| 685 | /// Cancellation token for the active engine turn. Tools that may wait on |
| 686 | /// external work should observe this so UI cancel can interrupt them. |
| 687 | pub cancel_token: Option<CancellationToken>, |
| 688 | /// Absolute deadline inherited from the active Engine turn after approval. |
| 689 | /// Nested model/code work may narrow this bound but must never reset it. |
| 690 | pub(crate) turn_deadline: Option<tokio::time::Instant>, |
| 691 | /// Optional external sandbox backend for shell execution. |
| 692 | /// When set, exec_shell routes commands through this instead of spawning |
| 693 | /// a local process. |
| 694 | pub sandbox_backend: Option<std::sync::Arc<dyn SandboxBackend>>, |
| 695 | /// Path to the user memory file. `None` when the user-memory feature |
| 696 | /// (#489) is disabled — tools that read or write the file should |
| 697 | /// short-circuit on `None` rather than fall back to a workspace-local |
| 698 | /// default. |
| 699 | pub memory_path: Option<PathBuf>, |
| 700 | /// LSP manager for post-edit diagnostics injection (#428). `None` when |
| 701 | /// LSP is disabled or the context is constructed in a test that does not |
| 702 | /// need diagnostics. Edit tools append a `<diagnostics>` block to their |
| 703 | /// result when this is present and the manager is enabled. |
| 704 | pub lsp_manager: Option<Arc<LspManager>>, |
| 705 | |
| 706 | /// Adaptive evidence router (#4619). Consulted only when |
| 707 | /// `CODEWHALE_ADAPTIVE_OUTPUT_ROUTING` opts the process in; under the |
| 708 | /// default classic lane this field is inert and bounding happens at the |
| 709 | /// engine/subagent completion boundary. `None` in sub-agents and test |
| 710 | /// contexts. |
| 711 | pub large_output_router: Option<crate::tools::large_output_router::LargeOutputRouter>, |
| 712 | |
| 713 | /// Which search backend `web_search` should use. Default: Firecrawl. Set via |
| 714 | /// `[search] provider` in config.toml. |
| 715 | pub search_provider: crate::config::SearchProvider, |
| 716 | /// Optional Firecrawl key, or required key for other API search providers. |
| 717 | /// Metaso also falls back to the `METASO_API_KEY` env var. |
| 718 | /// Baidu also falls back to `BAIDU_SEARCH_API_KEY`. |
| 719 | pub search_api_key: Option<String>, |
| 720 | /// Optional DuckDuckGo-compatible HTML endpoint override for `web_search`. |
| 721 | pub search_base_url: Option<String>, |
| 722 | /// Opaque client for the active route's documented first-party search |
| 723 | /// tool. It owns provider authentication internally and is attached only |
| 724 | /// when the exact route capability says server-side search is supported. |
| 725 | pub(crate) provider_native_search: Option<crate::client::ProviderNativeSearchClient>, |
| 726 | /// Exact active route capability facts. Unknown stays fail-closed. |
| 727 | pub(crate) route_capabilities: codewhale_config::route::RouteCapabilities, |
| 728 | /// Engine-served gate for calls nested inside an `execute_tools` program. |
| 729 | /// Set only on the context of one `execute_tools` call by the turn loop; |
| 730 | /// every nested call is planned and approved through the same gate a |
| 731 | /// direct call gets. `None` everywhere else (sub-agents, tests, exec |
| 732 | /// hosts without an engine turn), where code mode keeps its read-only, |
| 733 | /// auto-approved profile. |
| 734 | pub(crate) nested_call_gate: Option<crate::tools::codemode::NestedCallGate>, |
| 735 | /// Where the session's live permission posture lives. Set by the engine; |
| 736 | /// every agent call re-reads it (`None` keeps the posture above as is). |
| 737 | pub(crate) live_posture: Option<crate::core::engine::LivePosture>, |
| 738 | } |
| 739 | |
| 740 | impl std::ops::Deref for ToolContext { |
| 741 | type Target = ToolExecutionState; |
| 742 | |
| 743 | fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { |
| 744 | &self.execution |
| 745 | } |
| 746 | } |
| 747 | |
| 748 | impl std::ops::DerefMut for ToolContext { |
| 749 | fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut Self::Target { |
| 750 | &mut self.execution |
| 751 | } |
| 752 | } |
| 753 | |
| 754 | impl ToolContext { |
| 755 | /// Create an inert context for a registry that intentionally has no tools. |
| 756 | /// |
| 757 | /// Empty paths are deliberate: isolated Runtime Chat must not retain the |
| 758 | /// host workspace or derive project notes and MCP paths. Isolation comes |
| 759 | /// from callers pairing this context with an empty registry and allow-list |
| 760 | /// plus a zero tool-call budget; this constructor is not a security |
| 761 | /// boundary by itself. |
| 762 | #[must_use] |
| 763 | pub(crate) fn for_empty_registry() -> Self { |
| 764 | Self::with_options(PathBuf::new(), false, PathBuf::new(), PathBuf::new()) |
| 765 | } |
| 766 | |
| 767 | /// Create a new `ToolContext` with default settings. |
| 768 | #[must_use] |
| 769 | pub fn new(workspace: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self { |
| 770 | let workspace = workspace.into(); |
| 771 | // Prefer .codewhale, fall back to .deepseek for project-local state |
| 772 | let notes_path = codewhale_config::resolve_project_state_dir(&workspace, "notes.md") |
| 773 | .expect("hardcoded project notes state path is valid") |
| 774 | .1; |
| 775 | let mcp_config_path = codewhale_config::resolve_project_state_dir(&workspace, "mcp.json") |
| 776 | .expect("hardcoded project MCP state path is valid") |
| 777 | .1; |
| 778 | Self::with_options(workspace, false, notes_path, mcp_config_path) |
| 779 | } |
| 780 | |
| 781 | /// Create a `ToolContext` with all settings specified. |
| 782 | pub fn with_options( |
| 783 | workspace: impl Into<PathBuf>, |
| 784 | trust_mode: bool, |
| 785 | notes_path: impl Into<PathBuf>, |
| 786 | mcp_config_path: impl Into<PathBuf>, |
| 787 | ) -> Self { |
| 788 | let workspace = workspace.into(); |
| 789 | let shell_manager = new_shared_shell_manager(workspace.clone()); |
| 790 | let tool_authority = process_tool_authority(); |
| 791 | let shell_policy = match tool_authority.as_deref() { |
| 792 | Some(cap) => cap.shell.shell_policy(), |
| 793 | None => ShellPolicy::Full, |
| 794 | }; |
| 795 | Self { |
| 796 | workspace, |
| 797 | execution: Box::new(ToolExecutionState { |
| 798 | rlm_caller: None, |
| 799 | disallowed_tools: Vec::new(), |
| 800 | acp_host: None, |
| 801 | child_host: None, |
| 802 | human_decision: None, |
| 803 | shell_manager, |
| 804 | file_read_tracker: new_shared_file_read_tracker(), |
| 805 | owner_agent_id: None, |
| 806 | owner_agent_name: None, |
| 807 | origin_tool_call_id: None, |
| 808 | origin_turn_id: None, |
| 809 | tool_authority, |
| 810 | trust_mode, |
| 811 | sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::None, |
| 812 | notes_path: notes_path.into(), |
| 813 | mcp_config_path: mcp_config_path.into(), |
| 814 | skills_dir: None, |
| 815 | skills_discovery_mode: crate::skills::SkillDiscoveryMode::Compatible, |
| 816 | plugin_registry: None, |
| 817 | elevated_sandbox_policy: None, |
| 818 | persist_services_enabled: false, |
| 819 | shell_network_denied_hint: None, |
| 820 | auto_approve: false, |
| 821 | approval_mode: ApprovalMode::Suggest, |
| 822 | shell_policy, |
| 823 | features: Features::with_defaults(), |
| 824 | state_namespace: "workspace".to_string(), |
| 825 | route_context_window: None, |
| 826 | trusted_external_paths: Vec::new(), |
| 827 | follow_symlinks: false, |
| 828 | network_policy: None, |
| 829 | runtime: RuntimeToolServices::default(), |
| 830 | session_objects: None, |
| 831 | cancel_token: None, |
| 832 | turn_deadline: None, |
| 833 | sandbox_backend: None, |
| 834 | memory_path: None, |
| 835 | lsp_manager: None, |
| 836 | large_output_router: None, |
| 837 | search_provider: crate::config::SearchProvider::default(), |
| 838 | search_api_key: None, |
| 839 | search_base_url: None, |
| 840 | provider_native_search: None, |
| 841 | route_capabilities: codewhale_config::route::RouteCapabilities::default(), |
| 842 | nested_call_gate: None, |
| 843 | live_posture: None, |
| 844 | }), |
| 845 | } |
| 846 | } |
| 847 | |
| 848 | /// Create a `ToolContext` with auto-approve mode (YOLO). |
| 849 | pub fn with_auto_approve( |
| 850 | workspace: impl Into<PathBuf>, |
| 851 | trust_mode: bool, |
| 852 | notes_path: impl Into<PathBuf>, |
| 853 | mcp_config_path: impl Into<PathBuf>, |
| 854 | auto_approve: bool, |
| 855 | ) -> Self { |
| 856 | let mut context = Self::with_options(workspace, trust_mode, notes_path, mcp_config_path); |
| 857 | context.auto_approve = auto_approve; |
| 858 | // The bit stands for a posture, so fold it here rather than leaving the |
| 859 | // two fields to disagree. A turn-level builder overwrites this with the |
| 860 | // session's resolved posture, which is the authority that counts. |
| 861 | context.approval_mode = crate::core::authority::posture_from_auto_approve(auto_approve); |
| 862 | context |
| 863 | } |
| 864 | |
| 865 | /// Attach a per-domain network policy to this context (#135). |
| 866 | #[must_use] |
| 867 | pub fn with_network_policy(mut self, policy: NetworkPolicyDecider) -> Self { |
| 868 | self.network_policy = Some(policy); |
| 869 | self |
| 870 | } |
| 871 | |
| 872 | /// Attach durable runtime services to tools. |
| 873 | #[must_use] |
| 874 | pub fn with_runtime_services(mut self, runtime: RuntimeToolServices) -> Self { |
| 875 | self.runtime = runtime; |
| 876 | self |
| 877 | } |
| 878 | |
| 879 | /// Re-read the session's live permission posture (see `live_posture`) and |
| 880 | /// return what was read; `None` when this context has no live source. |
| 881 | pub(crate) fn refresh_live_posture( |
| 882 | &mut self, |
| 883 | ) -> Option<crate::core::engine::LiveRuntimeAuthority> { |
| 884 | let live = self.live_posture.clone()?; |
| 885 | let authority = live.apply(self); |
| 886 | if let Some(child) = self.child_host.as_ref() { |
| 887 | self.shell_policy = self.shell_policy.min_with(child.grant.shell_policy()); |
| 888 | } |
| 889 | Some(authority) |
| 890 | } |
| 891 | |
| 892 | /// Stamp tool work with the sub-agent that owns it. |
| 893 | #[must_use] |
| 894 | pub fn with_owner_agent( |
| 895 | mut self, |
| 896 | agent_id: impl Into<String>, |
| 897 | agent_name: impl Into<String>, |
| 898 | ) -> Self { |
| 899 | let agent_id = agent_id.into(); |
| 900 | let agent_name = agent_name.into(); |
| 901 | self.owner_agent_id = (!agent_id.trim().is_empty()).then_some(agent_id); |
| 902 | self.owner_agent_name = (!agent_name.trim().is_empty()).then_some(agent_name); |
| 903 | self |
| 904 | } |
| 905 | |
| 906 | /// Bind long-running work to the engine turn that created it. |
| 907 | #[must_use] |
| 908 | pub(crate) fn with_origin_turn_id(mut self, turn_id: impl Into<String>) -> Self { |
| 909 | self.origin_turn_id = Some(turn_id.into()); |
| 910 | self |
| 911 | } |
| 912 | |
| 913 | /// Bind long-running work to the tool call that created it. |
| 914 | #[must_use] |
| 915 | pub(crate) fn with_origin_tool_call_id(mut self, tool_call_id: impl Into<String>) -> Self { |
| 916 | self.origin_tool_call_id = Some(tool_call_id.into()); |
| 917 | self |
| 918 | } |
| 919 | |
| 920 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 921 | pub(crate) fn with_tool_authority( |
| 922 | mut self, |
| 923 | envelope: ToolAuthorityEnvelope, |
| 924 | ) -> Result<Self, String> { |
| 925 | let envelope = envelope.normalized()?; |
| 926 | if let Some(outer) = self.tool_authority.as_ref() |
| 927 | && !envelope.is_within(outer) |
| 928 | { |
| 929 | return Err( |
| 930 | "nested tool authority cannot expand its process authority cap".to_string(), |
| 931 | ); |
| 932 | } |
| 933 | self.tool_authority = Some(Arc::new(envelope)); |
| 934 | self.shell_policy = self.authority_clamped_shell_policy(self.shell_policy); |
| 935 | Ok(self) |
| 936 | } |
| 937 | |
| 938 | /// Attach skill discovery settings for tools that need to resolve |
| 939 | /// model-visible skills by name. |
| 940 | #[must_use] |
| 941 | pub fn with_skills_config( |
| 942 | mut self, |
| 943 | skills_dir: impl Into<PathBuf>, |
| 944 | discovery_mode: crate::skills::SkillDiscoveryMode, |
| 945 | ) -> Self { |
| 946 | self.skills_dir = Some(skills_dir.into()); |
| 947 | self.skills_discovery_mode = discovery_mode; |
| 948 | self |
| 949 | } |
| 950 | |
| 951 | #[must_use] |
| 952 | pub fn with_plugin_registry(mut self, registry: Arc<crate::plugins::PluginRegistry>) -> Self { |
| 953 | self.plugin_registry = Some(registry); |
| 954 | self |
| 955 | } |
| 956 | |
| 957 | /// Attach active prompt/history/session symbolic objects for RLM tools. |
| 958 | #[must_use] |
| 959 | pub fn with_session_objects(mut self, snapshot: SessionObjectSnapshot) -> Self { |
| 960 | self.session_objects = Some(snapshot); |
| 961 | self |
| 962 | } |
| 963 | |
| 964 | /// Attach the active engine cancellation token. |
| 965 | #[must_use] |
| 966 | pub fn with_cancel_token(mut self, cancel_token: CancellationToken) -> Self { |
| 967 | self.cancel_token = Some(cancel_token); |
| 968 | self |
| 969 | } |
| 970 | |
| 971 | /// Attach the effective shell policy for this turn. |
| 972 | #[must_use] |
| 973 | pub fn with_shell_policy(mut self, policy: ShellPolicy) -> Self { |
| 974 | self.shell_policy = self.authority_clamped_shell_policy(policy); |
| 975 | self |
| 976 | } |
| 977 | |
| 978 | /// Replace the turn shell policy while retaining the process authority as |
| 979 | /// an outer ceiling. Live mode changes rebuild this value on every tool |
| 980 | /// call, so the clamp belongs here rather than only at engine startup. |
| 981 | pub(crate) fn set_shell_policy(&mut self, policy: ShellPolicy) { |
| 982 | self.shell_policy = self.authority_clamped_shell_policy(policy); |
| 983 | } |
| 984 | |
| 985 | fn authority_clamped_shell_policy(&self, policy: ShellPolicy) -> ShellPolicy { |
| 986 | let policy = match self.tool_authority.as_deref() { |
| 987 | Some(cap) => policy.min_with(cap.shell.shell_policy()), |
| 988 | None => policy, |
| 989 | }; |
| 990 | self.child_host |
| 991 | .as_ref() |
| 992 | .map_or(policy, |child| policy.min_with(child.grant.shell_policy())) |
| 993 | } |
| 994 | |
| 995 | /// Attach an external sandbox backend for remote shell execution. |
| 996 | #[must_use] |
| 997 | pub fn with_sandbox_backend(mut self, backend: std::sync::Arc<dyn SandboxBackend>) -> Self { |
| 998 | self.sandbox_backend = Some(backend); |
| 999 | self |
| 1000 | } |
| 1001 | |
| 1002 | /// Set the user's trusted external paths (loaded from |
| 1003 | /// `~/.deepseek/workspace-trust.json`). See [`Self::resolve_path`] for |
| 1004 | /// how the list is consulted. |
| 1005 | #[must_use] |
| 1006 | pub fn with_trusted_external_paths(mut self, paths: Vec<PathBuf>) -> Self { |
| 1007 | self.trusted_external_paths = paths; |
| 1008 | self |
| 1009 | } |
| 1010 | |
| 1011 | /// Set whether tools should follow symbolic links. When `true`, |
| 1012 | /// `resolve_path` allows symlinked paths that resolve outside the |
| 1013 | /// workspace, and walk-based tools traverse symlinked directories. |
| 1014 | /// Mirrors the `workspace_follow_symlinks` setting. |
| 1015 | #[must_use] |
| 1016 | pub fn with_follow_symlinks(mut self, follow: bool) -> Self { |
| 1017 | self.follow_symlinks = follow; |
| 1018 | self |
| 1019 | } |
| 1020 | |
| 1021 | /// Attach an LSP manager so that edit tools can auto-inject diagnostics |
| 1022 | /// into their results after a successful file modification (#428). |
| 1023 | #[must_use] |
| 1024 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 1025 | pub fn with_lsp_manager(mut self, manager: Arc<LspManager>) -> Self { |
| 1026 | self.lsp_manager = Some(manager); |
| 1027 | self |
| 1028 | } |
| 1029 | |
| 1030 | /// Remember that the caller has observed the current on-disk state of a |
| 1031 | /// file. This is intentionally best-effort so successful reads/writes do |
| 1032 | /// not fail after completing only because a post-operation metadata lookup |
| 1033 | /// raced with filesystem changes. |
| 1034 | pub fn note_file_read(&self, path: &Path) { |
| 1035 | let Ok(snapshot) = file_read_snapshot(path) else { |
| 1036 | return; |
| 1037 | }; |
| 1038 | let Ok(mut tracker) = self.file_read_tracker.lock() else { |
| 1039 | return; |
| 1040 | }; |
| 1041 | tracker.reads.insert(path.to_path_buf(), snapshot); |
| 1042 | } |
| 1043 | |
| 1044 | /// Require a successful, still-fresh `read_file` snapshot before a narrow |
| 1045 | /// in-place edit. This catches model edits made against guessed or stale |
| 1046 | /// content while leaving transactional patch preflight separate. |
| 1047 | pub fn require_fresh_file_read( |
| 1048 | &self, |
| 1049 | path: &Path, |
| 1050 | requested_path: &str, |
| 1051 | ) -> Result<(), ToolError> { |
| 1052 | let prior = { |
| 1053 | let tracker = self.file_read_tracker.lock().map_err(|_| { |
| 1054 | ToolError::execution_failed( |
| 1055 | "Failed to check read-before-edit state: tracker lock poisoned".to_string(), |
| 1056 | ) |
| 1057 | })?; |
| 1058 | tracker.reads.get(path).cloned() |
| 1059 | }; |
| 1060 | |
| 1061 | let Some(prior) = prior else { |
| 1062 | return Err(ToolError::execution_failed(format!( |
| 1063 | "Refusing File action=\"edit\" for {} because it has not been read in this session. \ |
| 1064 | Recovery: call File with action=\"read\" path=\"{requested_path}\" to inspect the current contents, \ |
| 1065 | then retry File action=\"edit\" with a unique search string.", |
| 1066 | path.display() |
| 1067 | ))); |
| 1068 | }; |
| 1069 | |
| 1070 | let current = file_read_snapshot(path).map_err(|e| { |
| 1071 | ToolError::execution_failed(format!( |
| 1072 | "Refusing File action=\"edit\" for {} because the file could not be checked for staleness ({e}). \ |
| 1073 | Recovery: call File with action=\"read\" path=\"{requested_path}\" again, then retry File action=\"edit\".", |
| 1074 | path.display() |
| 1075 | )) |
| 1076 | })?; |
| 1077 | |
| 1078 | if current != prior { |
| 1079 | return Err(ToolError::execution_failed(format!( |
| 1080 | "Refusing File action=\"edit\" for {} because it changed since the last File action=\"read\" call. \ |
| 1081 | Recovery: call File with action=\"read\" path=\"{requested_path}\" again and retry with the current contents.", |
| 1082 | path.display() |
| 1083 | ))); |
| 1084 | } |
| 1085 | |
| 1086 | Ok(()) |
| 1087 | } |
| 1088 | |
| 1089 | /// Cap the authority a tool call asks for on work it hands off (a durable |
| 1090 | /// task or a scheduled automation) at what this session holds. Requested |
| 1091 | /// `allow_shell`, `trust_mode` and `auto_approve` bits are declarations |
| 1092 | /// from the model; each survives only when this session already has that |
| 1093 | /// authority, so delegated work never runs with more than its creator. |
| 1094 | pub(crate) fn cap_delegated_authority( |
| 1095 | &self, |
| 1096 | allow_shell: Option<bool>, |
| 1097 | trust_mode: Option<bool>, |
| 1098 | auto_approve: Option<bool>, |
| 1099 | ) -> (Option<bool>, Option<bool>, Option<bool>) { |
| 1100 | let holds_shell = self.shell_policy == ShellPolicy::Full; |
| 1101 | ( |
| 1102 | // An omitted flag falls back to the host's configured default, so |
| 1103 | // a session without full shell must say "no" for it rather than |
| 1104 | // leave it unset. |
| 1105 | match allow_shell { |
| 1106 | Some(requested) => Some(requested && holds_shell), |
| 1107 | None if holds_shell => None, |
| 1108 | None => Some(false), |
| 1109 | }, |
| 1110 | trust_mode.map(|requested| requested && self.trust_mode), |
| 1111 | auto_approve.map(|requested| requested && self.approval_mode == ApprovalMode::Bypass), |
| 1112 | ) |
| 1113 | } |
| 1114 | |
| 1115 | /// Resolve a path relative to workspace, validating it doesn't escape. |
| 1116 | /// |
| 1117 | /// This handles both existing files (using canonicalize) and non-existent files |
| 1118 | /// (for write operations) by canonicalizing the parent directory and appending |
| 1119 | /// the filename. |
| 1120 | /// Resolve a path relative to workspace, validating it doesn't escape. |
| 1121 | /// |
| 1122 | /// # Examples |
| 1123 | /// |
| 1124 | /// ```ignore |
| 1125 | /// # use crate::tools::spec::ToolContext; |
| 1126 | /// let ctx = ToolContext::new("."); |
| 1127 | /// let path = ctx.resolve_path("README.md")?; |
| 1128 | /// # Ok::<(), crate::tools::spec::ToolError>(()) |
| 1129 | /// ``` |
| 1130 | pub fn resolve_path(&self, raw: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, ToolError> { |
| 1131 | let candidate = if let Some(home_path) = resolve_home_path(raw)? { |
| 1132 | home_path |
| 1133 | } else if std::path::Path::new(raw).is_absolute() { |
| 1134 | PathBuf::from(raw) |
| 1135 | } else { |
| 1136 | self.workspace.join(raw) |
| 1137 | }; |
| 1138 | |
| 1139 | // In trust mode, allow any path without validation |
| 1140 | if self.trust_mode { |
| 1141 | // Still try to canonicalize for consistency, but don't require it |
| 1142 | return Ok(candidate.canonicalize().unwrap_or(candidate)); |
| 1143 | } |
| 1144 | |
| 1145 | // Try to canonicalize the workspace |
| 1146 | let workspace_canonical = self |
| 1147 | .workspace |
| 1148 | .canonicalize() |
| 1149 | .unwrap_or_else(|_| self.workspace.clone()); |
| 1150 | |
| 1151 | // When follow_symlinks is enabled, check the non-canonical (symlink) |
| 1152 | // path against the workspace first. A symlink inside the workspace |
| 1153 | // that resolves outside is allowed — the symlink itself is the gate. |
| 1154 | if self.follow_symlinks { |
| 1155 | let candidate_normalized = normalize_path(&candidate); |
| 1156 | let workspace_normalized = normalize_path(&self.workspace); |
| 1157 | let workspace_canonical_normalized = normalize_path(&workspace_canonical); |
| 1158 | |
| 1159 | if candidate_normalized.starts_with(&workspace_normalized) |
| 1160 | || candidate_normalized.starts_with(&workspace_canonical_normalized) |
| 1161 | { |
| 1162 | // The symlink (or plain path) is inside the workspace. |
| 1163 | // Return the canonicalized target so file I/O works correctly. |
| 1164 | if candidate.exists() { |
| 1165 | return Ok(candidate.canonicalize().unwrap_or(candidate)); |
| 1166 | } |
| 1167 | // Non-existent path: canonicalize the deepest existing ancestor |
| 1168 | return self.resolve_nonexistent_path(candidate, &workspace_canonical); |
| 1169 | } |
| 1170 | |
| 1171 | // Path is outside workspace even before resolving symlinks. |
| 1172 | // Fall through to the standard escape check. |
| 1173 | } |
| 1174 | |
| 1175 | // For the initial check, also try to canonicalize the candidate if possible |
| 1176 | // This handles symlinks like /var -> /private/var on macOS |
| 1177 | let candidate_canonical = candidate |
| 1178 | .canonicalize() |
| 1179 | .unwrap_or_else(|_| normalize_path(&candidate)); |
| 1180 | let workspace_normalized = normalize_path(&workspace_canonical); |
| 1181 | |
| 1182 | // Check if the candidate is under the workspace (comparing canonical paths) |
| 1183 | if !candidate_canonical.starts_with(&workspace_normalized) { |
| 1184 | // Also try with non-canonical workspace for cases where workspace itself |
| 1185 | // hasn't been canonicalized yet |
| 1186 | let workspace_plain = normalize_path(&self.workspace); |
| 1187 | let candidate_normalized = normalize_path(&candidate); |
| 1188 | if !candidate_normalized.starts_with(&workspace_plain) |
| 1189 | && !self.is_trusted_external_path(&candidate_canonical) |
| 1190 | && !self.is_trusted_external_path(&candidate_normalized) |
| 1191 | { |
| 1192 | return Err(ToolError::PathEscape { |
| 1193 | path: candidate_canonical, |
| 1194 | }); |
| 1195 | } |
| 1196 | } |
| 1197 | |
| 1198 | // For existing paths, use canonicalize directly |
| 1199 | if candidate.exists() { |
| 1200 | let canonical = candidate.canonicalize().map_err(|e| { |
| 1201 | ToolError::execution_failed(format!( |
| 1202 | "Failed to canonicalize {}: {}", |
| 1203 | candidate.display(), |
| 1204 | e |
| 1205 | )) |
| 1206 | })?; |
| 1207 | |
| 1208 | if !canonical.starts_with(&workspace_canonical) |
| 1209 | && !self.is_trusted_external_path(&canonical) |
| 1210 | { |
| 1211 | return Err(ToolError::PathEscape { path: canonical }); |
| 1212 | } |
| 1213 | |
| 1214 | return Ok(canonical); |
| 1215 | } |
| 1216 | |
| 1217 | self.resolve_nonexistent_path(candidate, &workspace_canonical) |
| 1218 | } |
| 1219 | |
| 1220 | /// Resolve `raw` against the workspace and require an existing directory. |
| 1221 | /// |
| 1222 | /// Tools that scope execution to a subdirectory (Run `cwd`) resolve |
| 1223 | /// through here so containment, existence, and the refusal wording have |
| 1224 | /// one owner. A workspace escape keeps the typed `PathEscape`; a missing |
| 1225 | /// or non-directory path names the fallback (drop the field to run in |
| 1226 | /// the workspace root). |
| 1227 | pub fn resolve_existing_dir(&self, raw: &str, field: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, ToolError> { |
| 1228 | let resolved = self.resolve_path(raw)?; |
| 1229 | if resolved.is_dir() { |
| 1230 | Ok(resolved) |
| 1231 | } else { |
| 1232 | Err(ToolError::invalid_input(format!( |
| 1233 | "{field} '{raw}' is not an existing directory inside the workspace; drop `{field}` to run in the workspace root" |
| 1234 | ))) |
| 1235 | } |
| 1236 | } |
| 1237 | |
| 1238 | /// Resolve a non-existent path by canonicalizing its deepest existing |
| 1239 | /// ancestor and validating the result is under the workspace or a |
| 1240 | /// trusted external path. |
| 1241 | fn resolve_nonexistent_path( |
| 1242 | &self, |
| 1243 | candidate: PathBuf, |
| 1244 | workspace_canonical: &Path, |
| 1245 | ) -> Result<PathBuf, ToolError> { |
| 1246 | let workspace_normalized = normalize_path(workspace_canonical); |
| 1247 | let workspace_plain = normalize_path(&self.workspace); |
| 1248 | let mut existing_ancestor = candidate.clone(); |
| 1249 | let mut suffix_parts: Vec<std::ffi::OsString> = Vec::new(); |
| 1250 | |
| 1251 | while !existing_ancestor.exists() { |
| 1252 | if let Some(file_name) = existing_ancestor.file_name() { |
| 1253 | suffix_parts.push(file_name.to_owned()); |
| 1254 | } |
| 1255 | match existing_ancestor.parent() { |
| 1256 | Some(parent) if !parent.as_os_str().is_empty() => { |
| 1257 | existing_ancestor = parent.to_path_buf(); |
| 1258 | } |
| 1259 | _ => { |
| 1260 | // No existing parent found; fall back to simple check |
| 1261 | break; |
| 1262 | } |
| 1263 | } |
| 1264 | } |
| 1265 | let ancestor_normalized = normalize_path(&existing_ancestor); |
| 1266 | |
| 1267 | let canonical_ancestor = if existing_ancestor.exists() { |
| 1268 | existing_ancestor |
| 1269 | .canonicalize() |
| 1270 | .unwrap_or(existing_ancestor) |
| 1271 | } else { |
| 1272 | existing_ancestor |
| 1273 | }; |
| 1274 | |
| 1275 | // Rebuild the full path from canonicalized ancestor |
| 1276 | let mut canonical = canonical_ancestor; |
| 1277 | for part in suffix_parts.into_iter().rev() { |
| 1278 | canonical.push(part); |
| 1279 | } |
| 1280 | let canonical = normalize_path(&canonical); |
| 1281 | |
| 1282 | if self.follow_symlinks |
| 1283 | && (ancestor_normalized.starts_with(&workspace_plain) |
| 1284 | || ancestor_normalized.starts_with(&workspace_normalized)) |
| 1285 | { |
| 1286 | return Ok(canonical); |
| 1287 | } |
| 1288 | |
| 1289 | // Validate it's under workspace, OR is under a user-trusted external |
| 1290 | // path (`/trust add <path>` from the slash command, persisted in |
| 1291 | // `~/.deepseek/workspace-trust.json`). |
| 1292 | if !canonical.starts_with(workspace_canonical) |
| 1293 | && !canonical.starts_with(&workspace_normalized) |
| 1294 | && !self.is_trusted_external_path(&canonical) |
| 1295 | { |
| 1296 | return Err(ToolError::PathEscape { path: canonical }); |
| 1297 | } |
| 1298 | |
| 1299 | Ok(canonical) |
| 1300 | } |
| 1301 | |
| 1302 | /// Whether `path` is under any of the user-trusted external roots. The |
| 1303 | /// caller should pass an already-canonicalized (or normalized) path. |
| 1304 | fn is_trusted_external_path(&self, path: &Path) -> bool { |
| 1305 | self.trusted_external_paths |
| 1306 | .iter() |
| 1307 | .any(|trusted| path.starts_with(trusted)) |
| 1308 | } |
| 1309 | |
| 1310 | /// Set the trust mode. |
| 1311 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 1312 | pub fn with_trust_mode(mut self, trust: bool) -> Self { |
| 1313 | self.trust_mode = trust; |
| 1314 | self |
| 1315 | } |
| 1316 | |
| 1317 | /// Set feature flags for tool execution. |
| 1318 | pub fn with_features(mut self, features: Features) -> Self { |
| 1319 | self.features = features; |
| 1320 | self |
| 1321 | } |
| 1322 | |
| 1323 | /// Override the shared shell manager. |
| 1324 | pub fn with_shell_manager(mut self, shell_manager: SharedShellManager) -> Self { |
| 1325 | self.shell_manager = shell_manager; |
| 1326 | self |
| 1327 | } |
| 1328 | |
| 1329 | /// Reuse the engine's session-scoped read snapshots across tool-context |
| 1330 | /// rebuilds. A fresh context is assembled for each turn, but successful |
| 1331 | /// reads must remain authoritative until the observed file changes. |
| 1332 | pub fn with_file_read_tracker(mut self, tracker: SharedFileReadTracker) -> Self { |
| 1333 | self.file_read_tracker = tracker; |
| 1334 | self |
| 1335 | } |
| 1336 | |
| 1337 | /// Set the elevated sandbox policy override. |
| 1338 | /// |
| 1339 | /// This is used when retrying a tool after a sandbox denial, to run |
| 1340 | /// with elevated permissions. |
| 1341 | pub fn with_elevated_sandbox_policy(mut self, policy: crate::sandbox::SandboxPolicy) -> Self { |
| 1342 | self.elevated_sandbox_policy = Some(policy); |
| 1343 | self |
| 1344 | } |
| 1345 | |
| 1346 | /// Carry a person's card decision to the one call it approved. |
| 1347 | #[must_use] |
| 1348 | pub(crate) fn with_human_decision( |
| 1349 | mut self, |
| 1350 | decision: crate::core::engine::HumanDecision, |
| 1351 | ) -> Self { |
| 1352 | self.human_decision = Some(decision); |
| 1353 | self |
| 1354 | } |
| 1355 | |
| 1356 | /// Set the shell network-denial hint used by network-restricted modes. |
| 1357 | pub fn with_shell_network_denied_hint(mut self, hint: impl Into<String>) -> Self { |
| 1358 | self.shell_network_denied_hint = Some(hint.into()); |
| 1359 | self |
| 1360 | } |
| 1361 | |
| 1362 | /// Set the namespace used for session-scoped tool state. |
| 1363 | pub fn with_state_namespace(mut self, namespace: impl Into<String>) -> Self { |
| 1364 | self.state_namespace = namespace.into(); |
| 1365 | self |
| 1366 | } |
| 1367 | |
| 1368 | /// Attach the active route's effective context window. |
| 1369 | #[must_use] |
| 1370 | pub fn with_route_context_window(mut self, context_window: u32) -> Self { |
| 1371 | self.route_context_window = (context_window > 0).then_some(context_window); |
| 1372 | self |
| 1373 | } |
| 1374 | |
| 1375 | /// Attach the adaptive evidence router (#4619). Consulted only under the |
| 1376 | /// `CODEWHALE_ADAPTIVE_OUTPUT_ROUTING` opt-in. |
| 1377 | #[must_use] |
| 1378 | pub fn with_large_output_router( |
| 1379 | mut self, |
| 1380 | router: crate::tools::large_output_router::LargeOutputRouter, |
| 1381 | ) -> Self { |
| 1382 | self.large_output_router = Some(router); |
| 1383 | self |
| 1384 | } |
| 1385 | } |
| 1386 | |
| 1387 | /// Gather LSP diagnostics for `paths` using the manager stored in `context`, |
| 1388 | /// and return the rendered `<diagnostics …>` blocks joined by newlines. |
| 1389 | /// |
| 1390 | /// Returns an empty string when: |
| 1391 | /// - `context.lsp_manager` is `None` |
| 1392 | /// - the manager's `enabled` flag is `false` |
| 1393 | /// - none of the files produce diagnostics (e.g. all clean, or language unknown) |
| 1394 | /// |
| 1395 | /// This function is non-blocking by design: every failure mode (missing LSP |
| 1396 | /// binary, timeout, unknown language) degrades to an empty string rather than |
| 1397 | /// propagating an error to the caller. |
| 1398 | pub async fn lsp_diagnostics_for_paths(context: &ToolContext, paths: &[PathBuf]) -> String { |
| 1399 | use crate::lsp::render_blocks; |
| 1400 | |
| 1401 | let manager = match context.lsp_manager.as_ref() { |
| 1402 | Some(m) if m.config().enabled => m, |
| 1403 | _ => return String::new(), |
| 1404 | }; |
| 1405 | |
| 1406 | let mut blocks = Vec::new(); |
| 1407 | for (idx, path) in paths.iter().enumerate() { |
| 1408 | if let Some(block) = manager.diagnostics_for(path, idx as u64).await { |
| 1409 | blocks.push(block); |
| 1410 | } |
| 1411 | } |
| 1412 | |
| 1413 | render_blocks(&blocks) |
| 1414 | } |
| 1415 | |
| 1416 | pub(crate) fn normalize_path(path: &Path) -> PathBuf { |
| 1417 | let mut prefix: Option<std::ffi::OsString> = None; |
| 1418 | let mut is_root = false; |
| 1419 | let mut stack: Vec<std::ffi::OsString> = Vec::new(); |
| 1420 | |
| 1421 | for component in path.components() { |
| 1422 | match component { |
| 1423 | Component::Prefix(prefix_component) => { |
| 1424 | prefix = Some(prefix_component.as_os_str().to_owned()); |
| 1425 | } |
| 1426 | Component::RootDir => { |
| 1427 | is_root = true; |
| 1428 | } |
| 1429 | Component::CurDir => {} |
| 1430 | Component::ParentDir => { |
| 1431 | let parent = Component::ParentDir.as_os_str(); |
| 1432 | if let Some(last) = stack.pop() { |
| 1433 | if last == parent { |
| 1434 | stack.push(last); |
| 1435 | stack.push(parent.to_owned()); |
| 1436 | } |
| 1437 | } else if !is_root { |
| 1438 | stack.push(parent.to_owned()); |
| 1439 | } |
| 1440 | } |
| 1441 | Component::Normal(part) => { |
| 1442 | stack.push(part.to_owned()); |
| 1443 | } |
| 1444 | } |
| 1445 | } |
| 1446 | |
| 1447 | let mut normalized = PathBuf::new(); |
| 1448 | if let Some(prefix) = prefix { |
| 1449 | normalized.push(prefix); |
| 1450 | } |
| 1451 | if is_root { |
| 1452 | normalized.push(Path::new(std::path::MAIN_SEPARATOR_STR)); |
| 1453 | } |
| 1454 | for part in stack { |
| 1455 | normalized.push(part); |
| 1456 | } |
| 1457 | normalized |
| 1458 | } |
| 1459 | |
| 1460 | /// Resolve an exact `~` or `~/` path prefix to the current user's home directory. |
| 1461 | /// |
| 1462 | /// Only exact `~` and `~/` (or `~\` on Windows) prefixes are resolved. Prefixes like |
| 1463 | /// `~otheruser`, shell variables (`$VAR`), command substitution, and globs are not |
| 1464 | /// expanded. Literal paths like `./~/file` stay literal. |
| 1465 | /// |
| 1466 | /// Returns: |
| 1467 | /// - `Ok(Some(path))` if `raw` has an exact home prefix and home was determined. |
| 1468 | /// - `Ok(None)` if `raw` does not have an exact home prefix. |
| 1469 | /// - `Err(ToolError)` if `raw` has an exact home prefix but user home could not be determined. |
| 1470 | pub(crate) fn resolve_home_path(raw: &str) -> Result<Option<PathBuf>, ToolError> { |
| 1471 | resolve_home_path_with(raw, crate::config::effective_home_dir) |
| 1472 | } |
| 1473 | |
| 1474 | pub(crate) fn resolve_home_path_with( |
| 1475 | raw: &str, |
| 1476 | home_lookup: impl FnOnce() -> Option<PathBuf>, |
| 1477 | ) -> Result<Option<PathBuf>, ToolError> { |
| 1478 | let suffix = if raw == "~" { |
| 1479 | "" |
| 1480 | } else if let Some(rest) = raw.strip_prefix("~/") { |
| 1481 | rest.trim_start_matches(|c| c == '/' || (cfg!(windows) && c == '\\')) |
| 1482 | } else { |
| 1483 | #[cfg(windows)] |
| 1484 | if let Some(rest) = raw.strip_prefix(r"~\") { |
| 1485 | rest.trim_start_matches(['/', '\\']) |
| 1486 | } else { |
| 1487 | return Ok(None); |
| 1488 | } |
| 1489 | #[cfg(not(windows))] |
| 1490 | return Ok(None); |
| 1491 | }; |
| 1492 | |
| 1493 | // A drive prefix is not a home-relative suffix. `PathBuf::join` would |
| 1494 | // otherwise replace the home on Windows (for example `~/C:\file`). |
| 1495 | #[cfg(windows)] |
| 1496 | if Path::new(suffix) |
| 1497 | .components() |
| 1498 | .any(|part| matches!(part, std::path::Component::Prefix(_))) |
| 1499 | { |
| 1500 | return Err(ToolError::invalid_input( |
| 1501 | "a home-relative path cannot contain a drive prefix", |
| 1502 | )); |
| 1503 | } |
| 1504 | let home = home_lookup().ok_or_else(|| { |
| 1505 | ToolError::execution_failed(format!( |
| 1506 | "Failed to resolve path '{raw}': user home directory could not be determined" |
| 1507 | )) |
| 1508 | })?; |
| 1509 | |
| 1510 | if suffix.is_empty() { |
| 1511 | Ok(Some(home)) |
| 1512 | } else { |
| 1513 | Ok(Some(home.join(suffix))) |
| 1514 | } |
| 1515 | } |
| 1516 | |
| 1517 | /// The core trait that all tools must implement. |
| 1518 | #[async_trait] |
| 1519 | pub trait ToolSpec: Send + Sync { |
| 1520 | /// Returns the unique name of this tool (used in API calls). |
| 1521 | fn name(&self) -> &str; |
| 1522 | |
| 1523 | /// Identifies the implementation in local registration diagnostics only. |
| 1524 | /// Adapters should use their existing source identity, never credentials, |
| 1525 | /// command arguments, descriptions, or other execution payloads. |
| 1526 | fn registration_origin(&self) -> std::borrow::Cow<'_, str> { |
| 1527 | std::any::type_name::<Self>().into() |
| 1528 | } |
| 1529 | |
| 1530 | /// Returns a human-readable description of what this tool does. |
| 1531 | fn description(&self) -> &str; |
| 1532 | |
| 1533 | /// Returns the JSON Schema for the tool's input parameters. |
| 1534 | fn input_schema(&self) -> Value; |
| 1535 | |
| 1536 | /// Returns the capabilities this tool has. |
| 1537 | fn capabilities(&self) -> Vec<ToolCapability>; |
| 1538 | |
| 1539 | /// Returns the approval requirement for this tool. |
| 1540 | fn approval_requirement(&self) -> ApprovalRequirement { |
| 1541 | let caps = self.capabilities(); |
| 1542 | if caps.contains(&ToolCapability::ExecutesCode) { |
| 1543 | ApprovalRequirement::Required |
| 1544 | } else if caps.contains(&ToolCapability::WritesFiles) { |
| 1545 | ApprovalRequirement::Suggest |
| 1546 | } else { |
| 1547 | ApprovalRequirement::Auto |
| 1548 | } |
| 1549 | } |
| 1550 | |
| 1551 | /// Returns the approval requirement for this concrete tool input. |
| 1552 | fn approval_requirement_for(&self, _input: &Value) -> ApprovalRequirement { |
| 1553 | self.approval_requirement() |
| 1554 | } |
| 1555 | |
| 1556 | /// Returns whether this tool is sandboxable. |
| 1557 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 1558 | fn is_sandboxable(&self) -> bool { |
| 1559 | self.capabilities().contains(&ToolCapability::Sandboxable) |
| 1560 | } |
| 1561 | |
| 1562 | /// Returns whether this tool is read-only. |
| 1563 | fn is_read_only(&self) -> bool { |
| 1564 | let caps = self.capabilities(); |
| 1565 | caps.contains(&ToolCapability::ReadOnly) |
| 1566 | && !caps.contains(&ToolCapability::WritesFiles) |
| 1567 | && !caps.contains(&ToolCapability::ExecutesCode) |
| 1568 | } |
| 1569 | |
| 1570 | /// Returns whether this concrete tool input is read-only. |
| 1571 | fn is_read_only_for(&self, _input: &Value) -> bool { |
| 1572 | self.is_read_only() |
| 1573 | } |
| 1574 | |
| 1575 | /// Returns whether this tool can be executed in parallel with others. |
| 1576 | fn supports_parallel(&self) -> bool { |
| 1577 | false |
| 1578 | } |
| 1579 | |
| 1580 | /// Returns whether this concrete tool input can run in parallel. |
| 1581 | fn supports_parallel_for(&self, _input: &Value) -> bool { |
| 1582 | self.supports_parallel() |
| 1583 | } |
| 1584 | |
| 1585 | /// Returns whether this input starts durable/detached work and returns |
| 1586 | /// immediately. Detached starts are not read-only, but in auto-approved |
| 1587 | /// turns they do not need to block neighboring read-only inspections. |
| 1588 | fn starts_detached_for(&self, _input: &Value) -> bool { |
| 1589 | false |
| 1590 | } |
| 1591 | |
| 1592 | /// Resolve input-specific policy without performing external side effects. |
| 1593 | /// |
| 1594 | /// Resource claims deliberately default to global exclusivity until a |
| 1595 | /// first-party tool opts into narrower, canonicalized claims. The initial |
| 1596 | /// seam records this decision but leaves the existing scheduler unchanged. |
| 1597 | fn prepare(&self, input: Value, _context: &ToolContext) -> Result<PreparedToolCall, ToolError> { |
| 1598 | Ok(PreparedToolCall { |
| 1599 | name: self.name().to_string(), |
| 1600 | description: self.description().to_string(), |
| 1601 | read_only: self.is_read_only_for(&input), |
| 1602 | supports_parallel: self.supports_parallel_for(&input), |
| 1603 | starts_detached: self.starts_detached_for(&input), |
| 1604 | approval: self.approval_requirement_for(&input), |
| 1605 | resources: vec![ResourceClaim::GlobalExclusive], |
| 1606 | input, |
| 1607 | }) |
| 1608 | } |
| 1609 | |
| 1610 | /// The approval-grant scope this tool's calls are keyed under instead of |
| 1611 | /// the name-derived key families, if it has one. `None` (every built-in, |
| 1612 | /// script and MCP tool) keeps [`crate::tools::approval_cache`]'s keys. |
| 1613 | /// |
| 1614 | /// Extension tools return `ext:<plugin_id>@<content_hash>`, so a session |
| 1615 | /// grant covers one reviewed plugin build: an updated plugin, or another |
| 1616 | /// plugin that later registers the same name, is asked again. |
| 1617 | fn approval_scope(&self) -> Option<String> { |
| 1618 | None |
| 1619 | } |
| 1620 | |
| 1621 | /// Who this tool is, if it is an extension tool: composed by Rust from its |
| 1622 | /// registration. `Some` makes the turn loop serve a permission gate for |
| 1623 | /// the tool's call, through which its `core/call`s are planned and |
| 1624 | /// approved like a model's, and makes the tool unreachable from any other |
| 1625 | /// extension's `core/call` (no recursion). `None` (every built-in, script |
| 1626 | /// and MCP tool) changes nothing. |
| 1627 | fn extension_caller(&self) -> Option<crate::tools::codemode::ExtensionCaller> { |
| 1628 | None |
| 1629 | } |
| 1630 | |
| 1631 | /// Returns whether this tool should be excluded from the model-visible |
| 1632 | /// tool catalog (deferred loading). Tools marked `true` are registered |
| 1633 | /// but not sent to the model until explicitly activated via tool search. |
| 1634 | fn defer_loading(&self) -> bool { |
| 1635 | false |
| 1636 | } |
| 1637 | |
| 1638 | /// Returns whether this tool should be advertised in the model-facing |
| 1639 | /// catalog. Hidden compatibility tools remain registered and executable |
| 1640 | /// by name so saved transcripts can replay without teaching new sessions |
| 1641 | /// the deprecated spelling. |
| 1642 | fn model_visible(&self) -> bool { |
| 1643 | true |
| 1644 | } |
| 1645 | |
| 1646 | /// Execute the tool with the given input and context. |
| 1647 | async fn execute(&self, input: Value, context: &ToolContext) -> Result<ToolResult, ToolError>; |
| 1648 | |
| 1649 | /// Execute with rich result blocks. Existing tools inherit text-only |
| 1650 | /// behavior; tools such as lowercase `read` can opt in without changing |
| 1651 | /// the published `ToolResult` struct. |
| 1652 | async fn execute_rich( |
| 1653 | &self, |
| 1654 | input: Value, |
| 1655 | context: &ToolContext, |
| 1656 | ) -> Result<RichToolResult, ToolError> { |
| 1657 | self.execute(input, context) |
| 1658 | .await |
| 1659 | .map(RichToolResult::plain) |
| 1660 | } |
| 1661 | } |
| 1662 | |
| 1663 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 1664 | mod tests; |
| 1665 |