| 1 | //! Bubblewrap (bwrap) passthrough for Linux sandbox (#2184). |
| 2 | //! |
| 3 | //! Bubblewrap is a setuid-less container runtime used by Flatpak and other |
| 4 | //! projects. It creates a new mount namespace with configurable bind mounts, |
| 5 | //! providing filesystem isolation without requiring root privileges. |
| 6 | //! |
| 7 | //! # How it works |
| 8 | //! |
| 9 | //! When `/usr/bin/bwrap` is executable AND the top-level config key |
| 10 | //! `prefer_bwrap` is set to `true`, exec_shell commands are routed through |
| 11 | //! bwrap. The bwrap invocation looks like: |
| 12 | //! |
| 13 | //! ```text |
| 14 | //! bwrap \ |
| 15 | //! --unshare-all \ |
| 16 | //! --ro-bind / / \ |
| 17 | //! --dev /dev \ |
| 18 | //! --proc /proc \ |
| 19 | //! --tmpfs /tmp \ |
| 20 | //! --bind <writable-root> <writable-root> \ |
| 21 | //! --chdir <cwd> \ |
| 22 | //! -- <program> <args> |
| 23 | //! ``` |
| 24 | //! |
| 25 | //! This creates a read-only view of the entire filesystem with write access |
| 26 | //! limited to the policy-derived writable roots. Policies that allow network |
| 27 | //! access add `--share-net` after `--unshare-all`. A private `/dev` and |
| 28 | //! `/proc` plus a tmpfs `/tmp` keep standard toolchain expectations working |
| 29 | //! (#5410); user-configured extra roots and device nodes append after them. |
| 30 | //! The read deny-list masks go last; exceptions inside a masked directory |
| 31 | //! (`SandboxManager::set_denied_read_exceptions`) are bound again after them. |
| 32 | //! |
| 33 | //! The extension host (`extension_host::supervisor`) launches through this |
| 34 | //! builder whenever bubblewrap works, without the `prefer_bwrap` opt-in; it |
| 35 | //! probes the finished command first and reports the host as unsandboxed, |
| 36 | //! with bwrap's own error, when it does not run. |
| 37 | //! |
| 38 | //! # Important |
| 39 | //! |
| 40 | //! We do NOT vendor bwrap. The user must install it themselves: |
| 41 | //! |
| 42 | //! - Ubuntu/Debian: `apt install bubblewrap` |
| 43 | //! - Fedora: `dnf install bubblewrap` |
| 44 | //! - Arch: `pacman -S bubblewrap` |
| 45 | //! |
| 46 | //! If bwrap is not executable, Codewhale reports no Linux OS sandbox and runs |
| 47 | //! the command without an OS wrapper. It never labels that fallback as |
| 48 | //! sandboxed. |
| 49 | |
| 50 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 51 | use super::policy::WritableRoot; |
| 52 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 53 | use std::collections::BTreeSet; |
| 54 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 55 | use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; |
| 56 | |
| 57 | /// Crate-visible wrapper over [`existing_directory`] so the sandbox module's |
| 58 | /// `BwrapMountExtensions::resolve` applies the same canonicalize + is_dir |
| 59 | /// rule to user-configured read-only roots (#5410). |
| 60 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 61 | pub(crate) fn existing_directory_shim(path: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> { |
| 62 | existing_directory(path) |
| 63 | } |
| 64 | |
| 65 | /// Canonical path to the bubblewrap binary. |
| 66 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 67 | pub const BWRAP_PATH: &str = "/usr/bin/bwrap"; |
| 68 | |
| 69 | /// Check if bubblewrap is installed and executable. |
| 70 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 71 | pub fn is_available() -> bool { |
| 72 | is_executable(std::path::Path::new(BWRAP_PATH)) |
| 73 | } |
| 74 | |
| 75 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 76 | fn is_executable(path: &std::path::Path) -> bool { |
| 77 | use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt; |
| 78 | |
| 79 | std::fs::metadata(path) |
| 80 | .is_ok_and(|metadata| metadata.is_file() && metadata.permissions().mode() & 0o111 != 0) |
| 81 | } |
| 82 | |
| 83 | #[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))] |
| 84 | pub fn is_available() -> bool { |
| 85 | false |
| 86 | } |
| 87 | |
| 88 | /// Build a bwrap command that wraps the given program and arguments. |
| 89 | /// |
| 90 | /// The returned command vector is suitable for use as `ExecEnv.command` — |
| 91 | /// it replaces the normal program+args with a bwrap invocation that sets |
| 92 | /// up a read-only root filesystem with write access only to the specified |
| 93 | /// policy roots. |
| 94 | /// |
| 95 | /// # Arguments |
| 96 | /// |
| 97 | /// - `cwd` — working directory and sandbox chdir target |
| 98 | /// - `program` — the program to run inside the container |
| 99 | /// - `args` — arguments to pass to the program |
| 100 | /// - `writable_roots` — policy-derived directories to remount read-write |
| 101 | /// - `network_access` — whether to retain the caller's network namespace |
| 102 | /// - `extensions` — user-configured extra read-only roots and writable |
| 103 | /// device nodes (#5410); skipped when they do not exist on the host |
| 104 | /// |
| 105 | /// # Returns |
| 106 | /// |
| 107 | /// A `Vec<String>` representing the full bwrap invocation. |
| 108 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 109 | pub fn build_bwrap_command( |
| 110 | cwd: &std::path::Path, |
| 111 | program: &str, |
| 112 | args: &[String], |
| 113 | writable_roots: &[WritableRoot], |
| 114 | network_access: bool, |
| 115 | extensions: &crate::sandbox::BwrapMountExtensions, |
| 116 | denied_read_subpaths: &[std::path::PathBuf], |
| 117 | denied_read_exceptions: &[std::path::PathBuf], |
| 118 | ) -> Vec<String> { |
| 119 | let (writable_mounts, read_only_mounts) = safe_mounts(writable_roots); |
| 120 | let (extra_read_only, device_mounts) = extensions.resolve(); |
| 121 | let mut cmd: Vec<String> = |
| 122 | Vec::with_capacity(10 + args.len() + 3 * (writable_mounts.len() + read_only_mounts.len())); |
| 123 | |
| 124 | cmd.push(BWRAP_PATH.to_string()); |
| 125 | |
| 126 | // Isolate every supported namespace by default. `--share-net` selectively |
| 127 | // retains only the network namespace when the resolved policy allows it. |
| 128 | cmd.push("--unshare-all".to_string()); |
| 129 | if network_access { |
| 130 | cmd.push("--share-net".to_string()); |
| 131 | } |
| 132 | // Tie the sandbox to the outer bwrap process: if it is killed (the TUI's |
| 133 | // parent-death cleanup, a group kill), bwrap's PID-namespace init dies |
| 134 | // too and takes every process in the sandbox with it (#6654). |
| 135 | cmd.push("--die-with-parent".to_string()); |
| 136 | |
| 137 | // Read-only bind-mount the entire root filesystem. |
| 138 | cmd.push("--ro-bind".to_string()); |
| 139 | cmd.push("/".to_string()); |
| 140 | cmd.push("/".to_string()); |
| 141 | |
| 142 | // Standard container essentials (#5410): a private `/dev` (so device |
| 143 | // nodes exist fresh and writable — `>/dev/null` under the read-only |
| 144 | // root bind is EROFS without this), `/proc`, and a writable isolated |
| 145 | // `/tmp` for toolchain scratch space. |
| 146 | cmd.push("--dev".to_string()); |
| 147 | cmd.push("/dev".to_string()); |
| 148 | cmd.push("--proc".to_string()); |
| 149 | cmd.push("/proc".to_string()); |
| 150 | cmd.push("--tmpfs".to_string()); |
| 151 | cmd.push("/tmp".to_string()); |
| 152 | |
| 153 | // User-configured writable device nodes (#5410), e.g. a host `/dev/null` |
| 154 | // when the caller needs the host's, not the fresh private one. |
| 155 | for device in device_mounts { |
| 156 | let device = device.to_string_lossy().into_owned(); |
| 157 | cmd.push("--dev-bind".to_string()); |
| 158 | cmd.push(device.clone()); |
| 159 | cmd.push(device); |
| 160 | } |
| 161 | |
| 162 | for root in &writable_mounts { |
| 163 | let root = root.to_string_lossy().into_owned(); |
| 164 | cmd.push("--bind".to_string()); |
| 165 | cmd.push(root.clone()); |
| 166 | cmd.push(root); |
| 167 | } |
| 168 | |
| 169 | // Re-apply protected descendants after all writable parents so a broad |
| 170 | // writable root cannot make .codewhale/.deepseek exceptions writable. |
| 171 | for root in read_only_mounts { |
| 172 | let root = root.to_string_lossy().into_owned(); |
| 173 | cmd.push("--ro-bind".to_string()); |
| 174 | cmd.push(root.clone()); |
| 175 | cmd.push(root); |
| 176 | } |
| 177 | |
| 178 | // User-configured extra read-only roots (#5410) apply last so they can |
| 179 | // narrow (re-mount read-only over) any earlier writable bind if the |
| 180 | // user explicitly lists a path the policy made writable. |
| 181 | for root in extra_read_only { |
| 182 | let root = root.to_string_lossy().into_owned(); |
| 183 | cmd.push("--ro-bind".to_string()); |
| 184 | cmd.push(root.clone()); |
| 185 | cmd.push(root); |
| 186 | } |
| 187 | |
| 188 | // Opt-in read deny-list (S1, #5568), applied after every bind so nothing |
| 189 | // re-exposes a denied path: an existing directory is masked with an empty |
| 190 | // tmpfs, an existing file with a bind of /dev/null. Non-existent paths |
| 191 | // are skipped — there is nothing to deny. |
| 192 | for denied in denied_read_subpaths { |
| 193 | cmd.extend(super::bwrap_mask_args(denied)); |
| 194 | } |
| 195 | |
| 196 | // Exceptions inside a masked directory (the extension host's own files |
| 197 | // and plugin code under a Codewhale home it denies whole) are bound again |
| 198 | // after the masks, then any denied path inside them is masked again. |
| 199 | cmd.extend(super::bwrap_exception_args( |
| 200 | denied_read_subpaths, |
| 201 | denied_read_exceptions, |
| 202 | &writable_mounts, |
| 203 | )); |
| 204 | |
| 205 | // Change to the working directory inside the container. |
| 206 | let cwd_str = cwd.to_string_lossy().to_string(); |
| 207 | cmd.push("--chdir".to_string()); |
| 208 | cmd.push(cwd_str); |
| 209 | |
| 210 | // Separator between bwrap args and the command to run. |
| 211 | cmd.push("--".to_string()); |
| 212 | |
| 213 | // The actual program and its arguments. |
| 214 | cmd.push(program.to_string()); |
| 215 | cmd.extend(args.iter().cloned()); |
| 216 | |
| 217 | cmd |
| 218 | } |
| 219 | |
| 220 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 221 | fn safe_mounts(writable_roots: &[WritableRoot]) -> (Vec<PathBuf>, Vec<PathBuf>) { |
| 222 | let mut writable = BTreeSet::new(); |
| 223 | let mut read_only = BTreeSet::new(); |
| 224 | |
| 225 | for root in writable_roots { |
| 226 | let Some(canonical_root) = safe_existing_directory(&root.root) else { |
| 227 | continue; |
| 228 | }; |
| 229 | writable.insert(canonical_root.clone()); |
| 230 | |
| 231 | for exception in &root.read_only_subpaths { |
| 232 | let Some(canonical_exception) = existing_directory(exception) else { |
| 233 | continue; |
| 234 | }; |
| 235 | if canonical_exception.starts_with(&canonical_root) { |
| 236 | read_only.insert(canonical_exception); |
| 237 | } |
| 238 | } |
| 239 | } |
| 240 | |
| 241 | ( |
| 242 | writable.into_iter().collect(), |
| 243 | read_only.into_iter().collect(), |
| 244 | ) |
| 245 | } |
| 246 | |
| 247 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 248 | fn safe_existing_directory(path: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> { |
| 249 | let canonical = existing_directory(path)?; |
| 250 | (canonical != Path::new("/")).then_some(canonical) |
| 251 | } |
| 252 | |
| 253 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 254 | fn existing_directory(path: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> { |
| 255 | let canonical = path.canonicalize().ok()?; |
| 256 | canonical.is_dir().then_some(canonical) |
| 257 | } |
| 258 | |
| 259 | /// Detect a failure attributable to the bubblewrap boundary. |
| 260 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 261 | pub fn detect_denial(exit_code: i32, stderr: &str) -> bool { |
| 262 | exit_code != 0 |
| 263 | && (stderr |
| 264 | .lines() |
| 265 | .any(|line| line.trim_start().starts_with("bwrap:")) |
| 266 | || stderr.contains("Read-only file system")) |
| 267 | } |
| 268 | |
| 269 | #[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))] |
| 270 | pub fn detect_denial(_exit_code: i32, _stderr: &str) -> bool { |
| 271 | false |
| 272 | } |
| 273 | |
| 274 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 275 | mod tests { |
| 276 | use super::*; |
| 277 | |
| 278 | #[test] |
| 279 | fn test_is_available_does_not_panic() { |
| 280 | let _ = is_available(); |
| 281 | } |
| 282 | |
| 283 | #[test] |
| 284 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 285 | fn test_build_bwrap_command_structure() { |
| 286 | let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir"); |
| 287 | let cwd = dir.path(); |
| 288 | let cmd = build_bwrap_command( |
| 289 | cwd, |
| 290 | "sh", |
| 291 | &["-c".to_string(), "echo hi".to_string()], |
| 292 | &[WritableRoot::new(cwd.to_path_buf())], |
| 293 | false, |
| 294 | &crate::sandbox::BwrapMountExtensions::default(), |
| 295 | &[], |
| 296 | &[], |
| 297 | ); |
| 298 | |
| 299 | // Should start with bwrap |
| 300 | assert_eq!(cmd[0], "/usr/bin/bwrap"); |
| 301 | |
| 302 | // Should have ro-bind for root |
| 303 | assert!(cmd.contains(&"--ro-bind".to_string())); |
| 304 | |
| 305 | // Standard container essentials (#5410): private /dev, /proc, tmpfs /tmp. |
| 306 | assert!(cmd.contains(&"--dev".to_string())); |
| 307 | assert!(cmd.contains(&"--proc".to_string())); |
| 308 | assert!(cmd.contains(&"--tmpfs".to_string())); |
| 309 | |
| 310 | // Should have --chdir |
| 311 | assert!(cmd.contains(&"--chdir".to_string())); |
| 312 | |
| 313 | // Network stays isolated unless the policy explicitly allows it. |
| 314 | assert!(cmd.contains(&"--unshare-all".to_string())); |
| 315 | assert!(!cmd.contains(&"--share-net".to_string())); |
| 316 | |
| 317 | // The sandbox dies with the outer bwrap process (#6654). |
| 318 | assert!(cmd.contains(&"--die-with-parent".to_string())); |
| 319 | |
| 320 | // Should end with the command |
| 321 | assert_eq!(cmd[cmd.len() - 1], "echo hi"); |
| 322 | assert_eq!(cmd[cmd.len() - 2], "-c"); |
| 323 | assert_eq!(cmd[cmd.len() - 3], "sh"); |
| 324 | } |
| 325 | |
| 326 | #[test] |
| 327 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 328 | fn read_only_command_does_not_remount_the_working_directory_writable() { |
| 329 | let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir"); |
| 330 | let cwd = dir.path(); |
| 331 | let cmd = build_bwrap_command( |
| 332 | cwd, |
| 333 | "true", |
| 334 | &[], |
| 335 | &[], |
| 336 | false, |
| 337 | &crate::sandbox::BwrapMountExtensions::default(), |
| 338 | &[], |
| 339 | &[], |
| 340 | ); |
| 341 | |
| 342 | assert!(!cmd.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--bind")); |
| 343 | assert!(!cmd.iter().any(|arg| arg == "--share-net")); |
| 344 | assert!( |
| 345 | cmd.windows(2) |
| 346 | .any(|args| args[0] == "--chdir" && args[1] == cwd.to_string_lossy()) |
| 347 | ); |
| 348 | } |
| 349 | |
| 350 | #[test] |
| 351 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 352 | fn workspace_write_mounts_every_safe_root_and_protects_read_only_descendants() { |
| 353 | let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir"); |
| 354 | let workspace = dir.path().join("workspace"); |
| 355 | let extra = dir.path().join("extra"); |
| 356 | let protected = workspace.join(".codewhale"); |
| 357 | std::fs::create_dir_all(&protected).expect("protected directory"); |
| 358 | std::fs::create_dir_all(&extra).expect("extra directory"); |
| 359 | |
| 360 | let roots = vec![ |
| 361 | WritableRoot::with_exceptions(workspace.clone(), vec![protected.clone()]), |
| 362 | WritableRoot::new(extra.clone()), |
| 363 | WritableRoot::new(dir.path().join("missing")), |
| 364 | WritableRoot::new(PathBuf::from("/")), |
| 365 | ]; |
| 366 | let cmd = build_bwrap_command( |
| 367 | &workspace, |
| 368 | "true", |
| 369 | &[], |
| 370 | &roots, |
| 371 | true, |
| 372 | &crate::sandbox::BwrapMountExtensions::default(), |
| 373 | &[], |
| 374 | &[], |
| 375 | ); |
| 376 | |
| 377 | for root in [&workspace, &extra] { |
| 378 | let canonical = root.canonicalize().expect("canonical root"); |
| 379 | assert!(has_mount(&cmd, "--bind", &canonical)); |
| 380 | } |
| 381 | assert!(has_mount( |
| 382 | &cmd, |
| 383 | "--ro-bind", |
| 384 | &protected.canonicalize().expect("canonical protected path") |
| 385 | )); |
| 386 | assert!(!has_mount(&cmd, "--bind", Path::new("/"))); |
| 387 | assert!(!cmd.iter().any(|arg| arg.ends_with("/missing"))); |
| 388 | |
| 389 | let unshare = cmd |
| 390 | .iter() |
| 391 | .position(|arg| arg == "--unshare-all") |
| 392 | .expect("unshare all"); |
| 393 | let share = cmd |
| 394 | .iter() |
| 395 | .position(|arg| arg == "--share-net") |
| 396 | .expect("share net"); |
| 397 | assert!(share > unshare); |
| 398 | } |
| 399 | |
| 400 | #[test] |
| 401 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 402 | fn extensions_add_ro_roots_and_device_nodes_and_skip_invalid_entries() { |
| 403 | let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir"); |
| 404 | let cwd = dir.path(); |
| 405 | let extra_ro = dir.path().join("vendor-libs"); |
| 406 | std::fs::create_dir_all(&extra_ro).expect("extra ro dir"); |
| 407 | |
| 408 | let extensions = crate::sandbox::BwrapMountExtensions { |
| 409 | read_only_roots: vec![ |
| 410 | extra_ro.clone(), |
| 411 | dir.path().join("missing-ro"), // silently skipped |
| 412 | ], |
| 413 | device_roots: vec![ |
| 414 | // A real char device on every Linux host: /dev/null. |
| 415 | PathBuf::from("/dev/null"), |
| 416 | // Not a device: skipped even though it exists. |
| 417 | extra_ro.clone(), |
| 418 | // Missing: skipped. |
| 419 | PathBuf::from("/dev/does-not-exist"), |
| 420 | ], |
| 421 | }; |
| 422 | let cmd = build_bwrap_command(cwd, "true", &[], &[], false, &extensions, &[], &[]); |
| 423 | |
| 424 | assert!(has_mount( |
| 425 | &cmd, |
| 426 | "--ro-bind", |
| 427 | &extra_ro.canonicalize().expect("canonical extra"), |
| 428 | )); |
| 429 | assert!(has_mount( |
| 430 | &cmd, |
| 431 | "--dev-bind", |
| 432 | &PathBuf::from("/dev/null") |
| 433 | .canonicalize() |
| 434 | .expect("canonical null") |
| 435 | )); |
| 436 | // The non-device directory must never appear as a dev-bind — the key |
| 437 | // is not a writable-root escape hatch. |
| 438 | assert!(!cmd.iter().any(|arg| arg.ends_with("/missing-ro"))); |
| 439 | let dev_binds_of_extra = cmd |
| 440 | .windows(3) |
| 441 | .any(|args| args[0] == "--dev-bind" && args[1].as_str() == extra_ro.to_string_lossy()); |
| 442 | assert!(!dev_binds_of_extra, "directories must not be dev-bound"); |
| 443 | } |
| 444 | |
| 445 | #[test] |
| 446 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 447 | fn extension_ro_roots_apply_after_writable_binds_so_they_can_narrow() { |
| 448 | let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir"); |
| 449 | let workspace = dir.path().join("workspace"); |
| 450 | let narrowed = workspace.join("vendor-libs"); |
| 451 | std::fs::create_dir_all(&narrowed).expect("dirs"); |
| 452 | |
| 453 | let roots = vec![WritableRoot::new(workspace.clone())]; |
| 454 | let extensions = crate::sandbox::BwrapMountExtensions { |
| 455 | read_only_roots: vec![narrowed.clone()], |
| 456 | device_roots: vec![], |
| 457 | }; |
| 458 | let cmd = build_bwrap_command( |
| 459 | &workspace, |
| 460 | "true", |
| 461 | &[], |
| 462 | &roots, |
| 463 | false, |
| 464 | &extensions, |
| 465 | &[], |
| 466 | &[], |
| 467 | ); |
| 468 | |
| 469 | let writable_pos = cmd |
| 470 | .windows(3) |
| 471 | .position(|args| { |
| 472 | args[0] == "--bind" |
| 473 | && args[1].as_str() == workspace.canonicalize().unwrap().to_string_lossy() |
| 474 | }) |
| 475 | .expect("workspace writable bind"); |
| 476 | let narrow_pos = cmd |
| 477 | .windows(3) |
| 478 | .position(|args| { |
| 479 | args[0] == "--ro-bind" |
| 480 | && args[1].as_str() == narrowed.canonicalize().unwrap().to_string_lossy() |
| 481 | }) |
| 482 | .expect("narrowed ro bind"); |
| 483 | assert!( |
| 484 | narrow_pos > writable_pos, |
| 485 | "extra ro roots must apply after writable binds so they can narrow them" |
| 486 | ); |
| 487 | } |
| 488 | |
| 489 | /// The extension host's form of the deny-list: its Codewhale home masked |
| 490 | /// whole, then its own files bound again read-only and its data dir |
| 491 | /// writable again, all after the mask; a missing exception is skipped. |
| 492 | #[test] |
| 493 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 494 | fn a_home_denied_whole_keeps_its_exceptions_after_the_mask() { |
| 495 | let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir"); |
| 496 | std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.path().join("home/extension-host/data")).expect("data dir"); |
| 497 | std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.path().join("home/secrets")).expect("secrets dir"); |
| 498 | let home = dir |
| 499 | .path() |
| 500 | .join("home") |
| 501 | .canonicalize() |
| 502 | .expect("canonical home"); |
| 503 | let bundle = home.join("extension-host"); |
| 504 | let data = bundle.join("data"); |
| 505 | let cmd = build_bwrap_command( |
| 506 | &data, |
| 507 | "true", |
| 508 | &[], |
| 509 | &[WritableRoot::new(data.clone())], |
| 510 | false, |
| 511 | &crate::sandbox::BwrapMountExtensions::default(), |
| 512 | std::slice::from_ref(&home), |
| 513 | &[bundle.clone(), home.join("plugins")], |
| 514 | ); |
| 515 | let at = |flag: &str, path: &Path| -> Vec<usize> { |
| 516 | cmd.windows(3) |
| 517 | .enumerate() |
| 518 | .filter(|(_, args)| args[0] == flag && args[1] == path.to_string_lossy()) |
| 519 | .map(|(index, _)| index) |
| 520 | .collect() |
| 521 | }; |
| 522 | let mask = at("--tmpfs", &home); |
| 523 | let exception = at("--ro-bind", &bundle); |
| 524 | let data_binds = at("--bind", &data); |
| 525 | assert_eq!(mask.len(), 1, "{cmd:?}"); |
| 526 | assert_eq!(exception.len(), 1, "{cmd:?}"); |
| 527 | assert!(mask[0] < exception[0], "{cmd:?}"); |
| 528 | assert!(data_binds.last() > Some(&exception[0]), "{cmd:?}"); |
| 529 | assert!(!cmd.iter().any(|arg| arg.ends_with("/plugins")), "{cmd:?}"); |
| 530 | } |
| 531 | |
| 532 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 533 | fn has_mount(command: &[String], flag: &str, path: &Path) -> bool { |
| 534 | let path = path.to_string_lossy(); |
| 535 | command.windows(3).any(|args| { |
| 536 | args[0] == flag |
| 537 | && args[1].as_str() == path.as_ref() |
| 538 | && args[2].as_str() == path.as_ref() |
| 539 | }) |
| 540 | } |
| 541 | |
| 542 | #[test] |
| 543 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 544 | fn executable_probe_requires_a_regular_executable_file() { |
| 545 | use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt; |
| 546 | |
| 547 | let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir"); |
| 548 | let path = dir.path().join("bwrap"); |
| 549 | std::fs::write(&path, b"fixture").expect("write fixture"); |
| 550 | assert!(!is_executable(&path)); |
| 551 | |
| 552 | let mut permissions = std::fs::metadata(&path).expect("metadata").permissions(); |
| 553 | permissions.set_mode(0o755); |
| 554 | std::fs::set_permissions(&path, permissions).expect("set executable bit"); |
| 555 | assert!(is_executable(&path)); |
| 556 | assert!(!is_executable(dir.path())); |
| 557 | } |
| 558 | |
| 559 | #[test] |
| 560 | fn denial_detection_requires_a_failed_sandbox_signal() { |
| 561 | assert!(!detect_denial(0, "bwrap: ignored on success")); |
| 562 | #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] |
| 563 | { |
| 564 | assert!(detect_denial(1, "bwrap: Creating new namespace failed")); |
| 565 | assert!(detect_denial(1, "Read-only file system")); |
| 566 | assert!(!detect_denial(1, "child output mentions bwrap: casually")); |
| 567 | assert!(!detect_denial(1, "Permission denied")); |
| 568 | assert!(!detect_denial(1, "Operation not permitted")); |
| 569 | assert!(!detect_denial(1, "ordinary command failure")); |
| 570 | } |
| 571 | } |
| 572 | } |
| 573 |