| 1 | package builtin |
| 2 | |
| 3 | import ( |
| 4 | "context" |
| 5 | "encoding/json" |
| 6 | "errors" |
| 7 | "fmt" |
| 8 | "os" |
| 9 | "path/filepath" |
| 10 | "strings" |
| 11 | "testing" |
| 12 | |
| 13 | "reasonix/internal/config" |
| 14 | "reasonix/internal/sandbox" |
| 15 | "reasonix/internal/secrets" |
| 16 | "reasonix/internal/testenv" |
| 17 | "reasonix/internal/tool" |
| 18 | ) |
| 19 | |
| 20 | func TestPowerShellToolUsesPwshIdentityAndConfinedLegacyAlias(t *testing.T) { |
| 21 | spec := sandbox.Spec{ |
| 22 | Mode: "enforce", |
| 23 | Shell: sandbox.Shell{Kind: sandbox.ShellPowerShell, Path: "pwsh"}, |
| 24 | } |
| 25 | primary := ConfineBash(spec, SessionDataGuard{}) |
| 26 | if primary.Name() != "pwsh" { |
| 27 | t.Fatalf("primary name = %q", primary.Name()) |
| 28 | } |
| 29 | schema := string(primary.Schema()) |
| 30 | for _, want := range []string{`"description"`, `"timeout_ms"`, `"run_in_background"`} { |
| 31 | if !strings.Contains(schema, want) { |
| 32 | t.Fatalf("pwsh schema missing %s: %s", want, schema) |
| 33 | } |
| 34 | } |
| 35 | if strings.Contains(schema, "preserve_background_processes") { |
| 36 | t.Fatalf("pwsh schema should require formal jobs: %s", schema) |
| 37 | } |
| 38 | legacy, ok := AliasBash(primary, "bash") |
| 39 | if !ok || legacy.Name() != "bash" { |
| 40 | t.Fatalf("legacy alias = %T/%v/%q", legacy, ok, legacy.Name()) |
| 41 | } |
| 42 | if got := legacy.(bash).sb.Mode; got != "enforce" { |
| 43 | t.Fatalf("legacy alias lost confinement: %q", got) |
| 44 | } |
| 45 | } |
| 46 | |
| 47 | func TestWindowsEnabledToolShellAliasesSelectOnlyPwsh(t *testing.T) { |
| 48 | workspace := Workspace{Bash: sandbox.Spec{ |
| 49 | Mode: "enforce", |
| 50 | Shell: sandbox.Shell{Kind: sandbox.ShellPowerShell, Path: "pwsh"}, |
| 51 | }} |
| 52 | for _, configured := range []string{"bash", "Bash", "PowerShell", "powershell", "pwsh"} { |
| 53 | tools := workspace.Tools(configured) |
| 54 | if len(tools) != 1 || tools[0].Name() != "pwsh" { |
| 55 | t.Fatalf("enabled %q produced %#v; want only pwsh", configured, tools) |
| 56 | } |
| 57 | } |
| 58 | } |
| 59 | |
| 60 | func TestGitBashToolBindingPreservesBashDialectAndStableSchema(t *testing.T) { |
| 61 | workspace := Workspace{Bash: sandbox.Spec{ |
| 62 | Mode: "off", |
| 63 | Shell: sandbox.Shell{Kind: sandbox.ShellBash, Path: `C:\Program Files\Git\bin\bash.exe`}, |
| 64 | }} |
| 65 | baseline := ConfineBash(workspace.Bash, SessionDataGuard{}) |
| 66 | for _, configured := range []string{"bash", "Bash", "PowerShell", "powershell", "pwsh"} { |
| 67 | tools := workspace.Tools(configured) |
| 68 | if len(tools) != 1 || tools[0].Name() != "bash" { |
| 69 | t.Fatalf("enabled %q produced %#v; want the bound Bash tool", configured, tools) |
| 70 | } |
| 71 | if tools[0].Description() != baseline.Description() || string(tools[0].Schema()) != string(baseline.Schema()) { |
| 72 | t.Fatalf("shell alias %q changed provider-visible Bash schema", configured) |
| 73 | } |
| 74 | bound := tools[0].(bash) |
| 75 | if bound.resolved() != workspace.Bash.Shell || strings.Contains(bound.Description(), "PowerShell command") { |
| 76 | t.Fatalf("Git Bash binding lost its dialect: %+v", bound) |
| 77 | } |
| 78 | } |
| 79 | } |
| 80 | |
| 81 | func isolateBuiltinTestUserState(t *testing.T) string { |
| 82 | t.Helper() |
| 83 | cleanup, err := testenv.IsolateUserState() |
| 84 | if err != nil { |
| 85 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 86 | } |
| 87 | t.Cleanup(cleanup) |
| 88 | return os.Getenv("HOME") |
| 89 | } |
| 90 | |
| 91 | func TestWithin(t *testing.T) { |
| 92 | root := filepath.FromSlash("/work/proj") |
| 93 | cases := []struct { |
| 94 | path string |
| 95 | want bool |
| 96 | }{ |
| 97 | {filepath.FromSlash("/work/proj"), true}, // the root itself |
| 98 | {filepath.FromSlash("/work/proj/a/b.go"), true}, // nested |
| 99 | {filepath.FromSlash("/work/proj/../proj/x"), true}, // normalises back inside |
| 100 | {filepath.FromSlash("/work/other"), false}, // sibling |
| 101 | {filepath.FromSlash("/work/proj-2"), false}, // prefix collision, not within |
| 102 | {filepath.FromSlash("/etc/passwd"), false}, // elsewhere |
| 103 | {filepath.FromSlash("/work"), false}, // parent |
| 104 | } |
| 105 | for _, c := range cases { |
| 106 | if got := within(root, filepath.Clean(c.path)); got != c.want { |
| 107 | t.Errorf("within(%q, %q) = %v, want %v", root, c.path, got, c.want) |
| 108 | } |
| 109 | } |
| 110 | } |
| 111 | |
| 112 | func TestConfineUnconfinedWhenNoRoots(t *testing.T) { |
| 113 | if err := confine(nil, "/anywhere/at/all"); err != nil { |
| 114 | t.Errorf("empty roots should be unconfined, got %v", err) |
| 115 | } |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | |
| 118 | func TestRebindBashWriteRootsUsesMinimalWriteSurface(t *testing.T) { |
| 119 | root := t.TempDir() |
| 120 | claim := filepath.Join(root, "claimed") |
| 121 | tool, ok := RebindBashWriteRoots(ConfineBash(sandbox.Spec{ |
| 122 | Mode: "enforce", |
| 123 | WriteRoots: []string{root}, |
| 124 | }, SessionDataGuard{}), []string{claim}) |
| 125 | if !ok { |
| 126 | t.Fatal("expected confined bash to be rebound") |
| 127 | } |
| 128 | rebound, ok := tool.(bash) |
| 129 | if !ok { |
| 130 | t.Fatalf("rebound tool type = %T, want bash", tool) |
| 131 | } |
| 132 | if !rebound.sb.MinimalWrites { |
| 133 | t.Fatal("rebound bash must disable write allowances outside claim roots") |
| 134 | } |
| 135 | want := realRoots([]string{claim}) |
| 136 | if len(rebound.sb.WriteRoots) != 1 || rebound.sb.WriteRoots[0] != want[0] { |
| 137 | t.Fatalf("write roots = %v, want %v", rebound.sb.WriteRoots, want) |
| 138 | } |
| 139 | } |
| 140 | |
| 141 | func TestReboundBashCannotWriteOutsideClaim(t *testing.T) { |
| 142 | if !sandbox.Available() { |
| 143 | t.Skip("OS sandbox unavailable") |
| 144 | } |
| 145 | root := t.TempDir() |
| 146 | claim := filepath.Join(root, "claimed") |
| 147 | if err := os.MkdirAll(claim, 0o755); err != nil { |
| 148 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 149 | } |
| 150 | rebound, ok := RebindBashWriteRoots(ConfineBash(sandbox.Spec{ |
| 151 | Mode: "enforce", |
| 152 | WriteRoots: []string{root}, |
| 153 | }, SessionDataGuard{}), []string{claim}) |
| 154 | if !ok { |
| 155 | t.Fatal("expected confined bash to be rebound") |
| 156 | } |
| 157 | |
| 158 | inside := filepath.Join(claim, "inside.txt") |
| 159 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"command": fmt.Sprintf("printf inside > %q", inside)}) |
| 160 | if _, err := rebound.Execute(context.Background(), args); err != nil { |
| 161 | t.Fatalf("write inside claim failed: %v", err) |
| 162 | } |
| 163 | if _, err := os.Stat(inside); err != nil { |
| 164 | t.Fatalf("write inside claim did not land: %v", err) |
| 165 | } |
| 166 | |
| 167 | outside := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "escaped.txt") |
| 168 | args, _ = json.Marshal(map[string]string{"command": fmt.Sprintf("printf escaped > %q", outside)}) |
| 169 | _, _ = rebound.Execute(context.Background(), args) |
| 170 | if _, err := os.Stat(outside); !os.IsNotExist(err) { |
| 171 | t.Fatalf("rebound bash wrote outside claim, stat err=%v", err) |
| 172 | } |
| 173 | } |
| 174 | |
| 175 | func TestConfineInsideAndOutside(t *testing.T) { |
| 176 | root := t.TempDir() |
| 177 | roots := realRoots([]string{root}) |
| 178 | |
| 179 | if err := confine(roots, filepath.Join(root, "src", "main.go")); err != nil { |
| 180 | t.Errorf("path inside root rejected: %v", err) |
| 181 | } |
| 182 | // A sibling of the root and a parent escape must both be refused. |
| 183 | if err := confine(roots, filepath.Join(root, "..", "escape.txt")); err == nil { |
| 184 | t.Error("parent-escape path accepted, want error") |
| 185 | } |
| 186 | if err := confine(roots, filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(root), "neighbour", "x")); err == nil { |
| 187 | t.Error("sibling path accepted, want error") |
| 188 | } |
| 189 | } |
| 190 | |
| 191 | func TestConfineRejectsSymlinkEscape(t *testing.T) { |
| 192 | root := t.TempDir() |
| 193 | outside := t.TempDir() |
| 194 | // A symlinked directory inside the root pointing outside must not become a |
| 195 | // tunnel: a write "within" the link still resolves outside the root. |
| 196 | link := filepath.Join(root, "out") |
| 197 | if err := os.Symlink(outside, link); err != nil { |
| 198 | t.Skipf("symlinks unavailable: %v", err) |
| 199 | } |
| 200 | roots := realRoots([]string{root}) |
| 201 | if err := confine(roots, filepath.Join(link, "evil.txt")); err == nil { |
| 202 | t.Error("write through symlinked dir escaped the root, want error") |
| 203 | } |
| 204 | // A normal file under the real root still passes. |
| 205 | if err := confine(roots, filepath.Join(root, "ok.txt")); err != nil { |
| 206 | t.Errorf("legit path rejected: %v", err) |
| 207 | } |
| 208 | } |
| 209 | |
| 210 | func TestWriteFileConfinement(t *testing.T) { |
| 211 | root := t.TempDir() |
| 212 | w := writeFile{roots: realRoots([]string{root})} |
| 213 | |
| 214 | // Inside: written. |
| 215 | in := filepath.Join(root, "a", "in.txt") |
| 216 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": in, "content": "hi"}) |
| 217 | if _, err := w.Execute(context.Background(), args); err != nil { |
| 218 | t.Fatalf("write inside root failed: %v", err) |
| 219 | } |
| 220 | if _, err := os.Stat(in); err != nil { |
| 221 | t.Errorf("file not created inside root: %v", err) |
| 222 | } |
| 223 | |
| 224 | // Outside: refused, and the file must not be created. |
| 225 | out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "out.txt") |
| 226 | args, _ = json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": out, "content": "nope"}) |
| 227 | if _, err := w.Execute(context.Background(), args); err == nil { |
| 228 | t.Error("write outside root should error") |
| 229 | } |
| 230 | if _, err := os.Stat(out); !os.IsNotExist(err) { |
| 231 | t.Error("file outside root must not be created") |
| 232 | } |
| 233 | } |
| 234 | |
| 235 | func TestWriteFileDefaultRootsDenyUserConfigUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) { |
| 236 | home := isolateBuiltinTestUserState(t) |
| 237 | |
| 238 | project := filepath.Join(home, "project") |
| 239 | if err := os.MkdirAll(project, 0o755); err != nil { |
| 240 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 241 | } |
| 242 | cfg := config.Default() |
| 243 | w := writeFile{roots: realRoots(cfg.WriteRootsForRoot(project))} |
| 244 | |
| 245 | userConfig := config.UserConfigPath() |
| 246 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{ |
| 247 | "path": userConfig, |
| 248 | "content": "default_model = \"deepseek\"\n", |
| 249 | }) |
| 250 | if _, err := w.Execute(context.Background(), args); err == nil { |
| 251 | t.Fatalf("write user config should be denied by default") |
| 252 | } |
| 253 | if _, err := os.Stat(userConfig); !os.IsNotExist(err) { |
| 254 | t.Fatalf("user config must not be created by default, stat err=%v", err) |
| 255 | } |
| 256 | |
| 257 | cfg.Sandbox.AllowWrite = []string{filepath.Dir(userConfig)} |
| 258 | w = writeFile{roots: realRoots(cfg.WriteRootsForRoot(project))} |
| 259 | if _, err := w.Execute(context.Background(), args); err != nil { |
| 260 | t.Fatalf("write user config should be allowed with allow_write: %v", err) |
| 261 | } |
| 262 | if _, err := os.Stat(userConfig); err != nil { |
| 263 | t.Fatalf("user config was not created with allow_write: %v", err) |
| 264 | } |
| 265 | } |
| 266 | |
| 267 | // stubConfigWriteApprover is a scripted tool.ConfigWriteApprover recording the |
| 268 | // paths it was asked about. |
| 269 | type stubConfigWriteApprover struct { |
| 270 | allow bool |
| 271 | reason string |
| 272 | asked []string |
| 273 | } |
| 274 | |
| 275 | func (s *stubConfigWriteApprover) ApproveManagedConfigWrite(_ context.Context, req tool.ConfigWriteRequest) (bool, string, error) { |
| 276 | s.asked = append(s.asked, req.Path) |
| 277 | return s.allow, s.reason, nil |
| 278 | } |
| 279 | |
| 280 | func TestManagedConfigWriteFailsClosedWithoutApprover(t *testing.T) { |
| 281 | home := isolateBuiltinTestUserState(t) |
| 282 | |
| 283 | project := filepath.Join(home, "project") |
| 284 | if err := os.MkdirAll(project, 0o755); err != nil { |
| 285 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 286 | } |
| 287 | cfg := config.Default() |
| 288 | managed := NewManagedConfigPaths(config.ReasonixManagedConfigPaths()) |
| 289 | w := writeFile{roots: realRoots(cfg.WriteRootsForRoot(project)), managed: managed} |
| 290 | |
| 291 | // Headless runs and sub-agents with no interactive parent carry no approver |
| 292 | // on ctx: the managed-config escape hatch must fail closed. |
| 293 | userConfig := config.UserConfigPath() |
| 294 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": userConfig, "content": "{}\n"}) |
| 295 | _, err := w.Execute(context.Background(), args) |
| 296 | if err == nil { |
| 297 | t.Fatalf("managed config write without an approver should be denied") |
| 298 | } |
| 299 | if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "interactive user approval") { |
| 300 | t.Fatalf("fail-closed error should name the missing approval, got: %v", err) |
| 301 | } |
| 302 | if _, err := os.Stat(userConfig); !os.IsNotExist(err) { |
| 303 | t.Fatalf("user config must not be created without approval, stat err=%v", err) |
| 304 | } |
| 305 | } |
| 306 | |
| 307 | func TestManagedConfigWriteGatedOnApprover(t *testing.T) { |
| 308 | home := isolateBuiltinTestUserState(t) |
| 309 | |
| 310 | project := filepath.Join(home, "project") |
| 311 | if err := os.MkdirAll(project, 0o755); err != nil { |
| 312 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 313 | } |
| 314 | cfg := config.Default() |
| 315 | managed := NewManagedConfigPaths(config.ReasonixManagedConfigPaths()) |
| 316 | w := writeFile{roots: realRoots(cfg.WriteRootsForRoot(project)), managed: managed} |
| 317 | |
| 318 | // Approved: current config.toml and the legacy v0.x config.json become |
| 319 | // writable, and the approver sees each target. |
| 320 | approve := &stubConfigWriteApprover{allow: true} |
| 321 | ctx := tool.WithConfigWriteApprover(context.Background(), approve) |
| 322 | for _, target := range []string{ |
| 323 | config.UserConfigPath(), |
| 324 | filepath.Join(home, ".reasonix", "config.json"), |
| 325 | } { |
| 326 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": target, "content": "{}\n"}) |
| 327 | if _, err := w.Execute(ctx, args); err != nil { |
| 328 | t.Fatalf("approved managed config write %s: %v", target, err) |
| 329 | } |
| 330 | if _, err := os.Stat(target); err != nil { |
| 331 | t.Fatalf("managed config was not created %s: %v", target, err) |
| 332 | } |
| 333 | } |
| 334 | if len(approve.asked) != 2 { |
| 335 | t.Fatalf("approver should be asked once per write, asked=%v", approve.asked) |
| 336 | } |
| 337 | |
| 338 | // Declined: the approver's reason surfaces to the model and nothing lands. |
| 339 | decline := &stubConfigWriteApprover{allow: false, reason: "the user declined this Reasonix config write"} |
| 340 | dctx := tool.WithConfigWriteApprover(context.Background(), decline) |
| 341 | declinedTarget := config.UserConfigPath() |
| 342 | if err := os.Remove(declinedTarget); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { |
| 343 | t.Fatalf("remove approved config before declined write: %v", err) |
| 344 | } |
| 345 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": declinedTarget, "content": "{}\n"}) |
| 346 | if _, err := w.Execute(dctx, args); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "declined") { |
| 347 | t.Fatalf("declined managed config write should surface the reason, got: %v", err) |
| 348 | } |
| 349 | if _, err := os.Stat(declinedTarget); !os.IsNotExist(err) { |
| 350 | t.Fatalf("declined config must not be created, stat err=%v", err) |
| 351 | } |
| 352 | |
| 353 | // Even with an always-allowing approver, non-config files in the Reasonix |
| 354 | // home and the rest of the OS home stay denied — the escape hatch is |
| 355 | // file-level, not directory-level. |
| 356 | for _, target := range []string{ |
| 357 | filepath.Join(home, "notes.txt"), |
| 358 | filepath.Join(home, ".reasonix", ".env"), |
| 359 | filepath.Join(home, ".reasonix", "settings.json"), |
| 360 | filepath.Join(home, ".reasonix", "skills", "evil", "SKILL.md"), |
| 361 | } { |
| 362 | asked := len(approve.asked) |
| 363 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": target, "content": "nope\n"}) |
| 364 | if _, err := w.Execute(ctx, args); err == nil { |
| 365 | t.Fatalf("write outside managed config files should be denied: %s", target) |
| 366 | } |
| 367 | if len(approve.asked) != asked { |
| 368 | t.Fatalf("non-managed target %s must not reach the approver", target) |
| 369 | } |
| 370 | if _, err := os.Stat(target); !os.IsNotExist(err) { |
| 371 | t.Fatalf("file must not be created %s, stat err=%v", target, err) |
| 372 | } |
| 373 | } |
| 374 | } |
| 375 | |
| 376 | // TestManagedConfigWriteAsksEvenInsideRoots pins that a Reasonix-managed config |
| 377 | // file stays gated behind the fresh per-write approval even when the write |
| 378 | // roots already cover it: YOLO and a widened allow_write must never let an |
| 379 | // agent rewrite config.toml silently. |
| 380 | func TestManagedConfigWriteAsksEvenInsideRoots(t *testing.T) { |
| 381 | home := isolateBuiltinTestUserState(t) |
| 382 | if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(home, ".reasonix"), 0o755); err != nil { |
| 383 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 384 | } |
| 385 | cfg := config.Default() |
| 386 | userConfig := config.UserConfigPath() |
| 387 | // The whole isolated home is a write root, config.toml included. |
| 388 | cfg.Sandbox.AllowWrite = []string{home} |
| 389 | managed := NewManagedConfigPaths(config.ReasonixManagedConfigPaths()) |
| 390 | w := writeFile{roots: realRoots(cfg.WriteRootsForRoot(home)), managed: managed} |
| 391 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": userConfig, "content": "{}\n"}) |
| 392 | |
| 393 | // No approver: fails closed even though the path is inside the roots. |
| 394 | if _, err := w.Execute(context.Background(), args); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "interactive user approval") { |
| 395 | t.Fatalf("in-root managed config write without an approver should be denied, got: %v", err) |
| 396 | } |
| 397 | if _, err := os.Stat(userConfig); !os.IsNotExist(err) { |
| 398 | t.Fatalf("user config must not be created without approval, stat err=%v", err) |
| 399 | } |
| 400 | |
| 401 | // Approved: the approver is consulted and the write lands. |
| 402 | approve := &stubConfigWriteApprover{allow: true} |
| 403 | ctx := tool.WithConfigWriteApprover(context.Background(), approve) |
| 404 | if _, err := w.Execute(ctx, args); err != nil { |
| 405 | t.Fatalf("approved in-root managed config write: %v", err) |
| 406 | } |
| 407 | if len(approve.asked) != 1 || approve.asked[0] != userConfig { |
| 408 | t.Fatalf("approver should be asked for the in-root config path, asked=%v", approve.asked) |
| 409 | } |
| 410 | |
| 411 | // Declined: reason surfaces, nothing lands. |
| 412 | decline := &stubConfigWriteApprover{allow: false, reason: "the user declined this Reasonix config write"} |
| 413 | dctx := tool.WithConfigWriteApprover(context.Background(), decline) |
| 414 | if err := os.Remove(userConfig); err != nil { |
| 415 | t.Fatalf("remove approved config before declined write: %v", err) |
| 416 | } |
| 417 | if _, err := w.Execute(dctx, args); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "declined") { |
| 418 | t.Fatalf("declined in-root managed config write should surface the reason, got: %v", err) |
| 419 | } |
| 420 | if _, err := os.Stat(userConfig); !os.IsNotExist(err) { |
| 421 | t.Fatalf("declined config must not be created, stat err=%v", err) |
| 422 | } |
| 423 | |
| 424 | // A plain file inside the roots still writes silently: the managed gate is |
| 425 | // file-level, not directory-level. |
| 426 | plain := filepath.Join(home, "notes.txt") |
| 427 | pargs, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": plain, "content": "hi\n"}) |
| 428 | if _, err := w.Execute(context.Background(), pargs); err != nil { |
| 429 | t.Fatalf("plain in-root write must not consult the approver: %v", err) |
| 430 | } |
| 431 | if len(approve.asked) != 1 { |
| 432 | t.Fatalf("plain in-root write must not reach the approver, asked=%v", approve.asked) |
| 433 | } |
| 434 | } |
| 435 | |
| 436 | func TestBashSandboxConfinement(t *testing.T) { |
| 437 | if !sandbox.Available() { |
| 438 | t.Skip("OS sandbox not available") |
| 439 | } |
| 440 | home, err := os.UserHomeDir() |
| 441 | if err != nil { |
| 442 | t.Skipf("no home dir: %v", err) |
| 443 | } |
| 444 | work, err := os.MkdirTemp(home, ".reasonix-bashsb-*") |
| 445 | if err != nil { |
| 446 | t.Skipf("cannot create work dir under home: %v", err) |
| 447 | } |
| 448 | t.Cleanup(func() { os.RemoveAll(work) }) |
| 449 | t.Chdir(work) |
| 450 | spec := sandbox.Spec{Mode: "enforce", WriteRoots: []string{work}, Network: true} |
| 451 | b := ConfineBash(spec, SessionDataGuard{}) |
| 452 | |
| 453 | // Writing inside the root works; writing to a sibling under $HOME is denied |
| 454 | // by the sandbox the bash tool wrapped the command in. |
| 455 | inCommand := "echo hi > " + filepath.Join(work, "in.txt") |
| 456 | inArgs, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"command": inCommand}) |
| 457 | if _, err := b.Execute(context.Background(), inArgs); err != nil { |
| 458 | t.Fatalf("bash write inside root failed: %v", err) |
| 459 | } |
| 460 | outPath := filepath.Join(home, ".reasonix-bashsb-escape.txt") |
| 461 | t.Cleanup(func() { os.Remove(outPath) }) |
| 462 | outCommand := "echo nope > " + outPath |
| 463 | outArgs, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"command": outCommand}) |
| 464 | if _, err := b.Execute(context.Background(), outArgs); err == nil { |
| 465 | t.Error("bash write outside the workspace should be denied by the sandbox") |
| 466 | } |
| 467 | if _, err := os.Stat(outPath); !os.IsNotExist(err) { |
| 468 | t.Error("escaping write must not create the file") |
| 469 | } |
| 470 | } |
| 471 | |
| 472 | func TestBashEnforceRejectsWhenSandboxUnavailable(t *testing.T) { |
| 473 | requirePOSIXShellTest(t) |
| 474 | t.Setenv("PATH", t.TempDir()) |
| 475 | |
| 476 | exe, err := os.Executable() |
| 477 | if err != nil { |
| 478 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 479 | } |
| 480 | b := bash{ |
| 481 | sb: sandbox.Spec{ |
| 482 | Mode: "enforce", |
| 483 | WriteRoots: []string{t.TempDir()}, |
| 484 | }, |
| 485 | shell: sandbox.Shell{Kind: sandbox.ShellBash, Path: exe}, |
| 486 | } |
| 487 | |
| 488 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"command": "ignored"}) |
| 489 | out, err := b.Execute(context.Background(), args) |
| 490 | if err == nil { |
| 491 | t.Fatal("bash should reject enforce mode when the OS sandbox is unavailable") |
| 492 | } |
| 493 | if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "shell sandbox requested but unavailable") { |
| 494 | t.Fatalf("error = %q, want sandbox unavailable", err) |
| 495 | } |
| 496 | if out != "" { |
| 497 | t.Fatalf("output = %q, want no command execution", out) |
| 498 | } |
| 499 | } |
| 500 | |
| 501 | func TestUnconfinedWriterWritesAnywhere(t *testing.T) { |
| 502 | // A zero-value writer (roots nil, as registered at init) is unconfined. |
| 503 | out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "free.txt") |
| 504 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": out, "content": "ok"}) |
| 505 | if _, err := (writeFile{}).Execute(context.Background(), args); err != nil { |
| 506 | t.Fatalf("unconfined write failed: %v", err) |
| 507 | } |
| 508 | if _, err := os.Stat(out); err != nil { |
| 509 | t.Errorf("unconfined writer did not write: %v", err) |
| 510 | } |
| 511 | } |
| 512 | |
| 513 | // confineRead & ConfineReaders |
| 514 | |
| 515 | func TestConfineReadEmpty(t *testing.T) { |
| 516 | if confineRead(nil, "/anywhere") { |
| 517 | t.Error("empty forbidRoots should be unconfined") |
| 518 | } |
| 519 | } |
| 520 | |
| 521 | func TestConfineReadInsideAndOutside(t *testing.T) { |
| 522 | root := t.TempDir() |
| 523 | forbidRoots := realRoots([]string{root}) |
| 524 | |
| 525 | if !confineRead(forbidRoots, filepath.Join(root, "secret", "key.pem")) { |
| 526 | t.Error("path inside forbid root should be forbidden") |
| 527 | } |
| 528 | // A path outside must pass. |
| 529 | if confineRead(forbidRoots, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ok.txt")) { |
| 530 | t.Error("path outside forbid root should not be forbidden") |
| 531 | } |
| 532 | } |
| 533 | |
| 534 | func TestConfineReadExactFileRoot(t *testing.T) { |
| 535 | dir := t.TempDir() |
| 536 | secret := filepath.Join(dir, "credentials.env") |
| 537 | visible := filepath.Join(dir, "project.env") |
| 538 | for _, path := range []string{secret, visible} { |
| 539 | if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("value"), 0o600); err != nil { |
| 540 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 541 | } |
| 542 | } |
| 543 | forbidRoots := realRoots([]string{secret}) |
| 544 | if !confineRead(forbidRoots, secret) { |
| 545 | t.Fatal("exact forbidden file should be unreadable") |
| 546 | } |
| 547 | if confineRead(forbidRoots, visible) { |
| 548 | t.Fatal("sibling file should remain readable") |
| 549 | } |
| 550 | } |
| 551 | |
| 552 | func TestConfineReadBlocksReadFile(t *testing.T) { |
| 553 | forbidDir := t.TempDir() |
| 554 | secretPath := filepath.Join(forbidDir, "secret.txt") |
| 555 | if err := os.WriteFile(secretPath, []byte("classified"), 0o644); err != nil { |
| 556 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 557 | } |
| 558 | forbidRoots := realRoots([]string{forbidDir}) |
| 559 | rf := readFile{forbidRoots: forbidRoots} |
| 560 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": secretPath}) |
| 561 | _, err := rf.Execute(context.Background(), args) |
| 562 | if err == nil { |
| 563 | t.Error("read_file should refuse a forbid-read path") |
| 564 | } |
| 565 | var pathErr *os.PathError |
| 566 | if !errors.As(err, &pathErr) { |
| 567 | t.Errorf("read_file forbid-read error should be *os.PathError, got %T: %v", err, err) |
| 568 | } |
| 569 | // Unconfined (nil forbidRoots) should work. |
| 570 | rfUnconfined := readFile{} |
| 571 | if _, err := rfUnconfined.Execute(context.Background(), args); err != nil { |
| 572 | t.Errorf("unconfined read_file should work: %v", err) |
| 573 | } |
| 574 | } |
| 575 | |
| 576 | // withProtectSensitiveFiles flips the [secrets] protect_sensitive_files |
| 577 | // toggle for one test and restores the default-off state afterwards. |
| 578 | func withProtectSensitiveFiles(t *testing.T, enabled bool) { |
| 579 | t.Helper() |
| 580 | secrets.SetProtectSensitiveFiles(enabled) |
| 581 | t.Cleanup(func() { secrets.SetProtectSensitiveFiles(false) }) |
| 582 | } |
| 583 | |
| 584 | func TestSensitiveReadPathsAreBlockedWhenProtected(t *testing.T) { |
| 585 | withProtectSensitiveFiles(t, true) |
| 586 | dir := t.TempDir() |
| 587 | envPath := filepath.Join(dir, ".env") |
| 588 | if err := os.WriteFile(envPath, []byte("DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=sk-real-secret-value-123456\n"), 0o600); err != nil { |
| 589 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 590 | } |
| 591 | pemPath := filepath.Join(dir, "client.pem") |
| 592 | if err := os.WriteFile(pemPath, []byte("PRIVATE KEY"), 0o600); err != nil { |
| 593 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 594 | } |
| 595 | |
| 596 | for _, path := range []string{envPath, pemPath} { |
| 597 | if !confineRead(nil, path) { |
| 598 | t.Fatalf("sensitive path %s should be blocked when protection is on", path) |
| 599 | } |
| 600 | rf := readFile{} |
| 601 | _, err := rf.Execute(context.Background(), argsJSON(t, map[string]any{"path": path})) |
| 602 | if err == nil { |
| 603 | t.Fatalf("read_file should refuse sensitive path %s", path) |
| 604 | } |
| 605 | } |
| 606 | |
| 607 | visible := filepath.Join(dir, "notes.txt") |
| 608 | if err := os.WriteFile(visible, []byte("ok"), 0o644); err != nil { |
| 609 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 610 | } |
| 611 | if confineRead(nil, visible) { |
| 612 | t.Fatalf("ordinary path %s should not be blocked", visible) |
| 613 | } |
| 614 | } |
| 615 | |
| 616 | func TestSensitiveReadPathsAllowedByDefault(t *testing.T) { |
| 617 | dir := t.TempDir() |
| 618 | envPath := filepath.Join(dir, ".env") |
| 619 | if err := os.WriteFile(envPath, []byte("PORT=8080\n"), 0o600); err != nil { |
| 620 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 621 | } |
| 622 | if confineRead(nil, envPath) { |
| 623 | t.Fatalf(".env should stay readable while protect_sensitive_files is off (default)") |
| 624 | } |
| 625 | rf := readFile{} |
| 626 | out, err := rf.Execute(context.Background(), argsJSON(t, map[string]any{"path": envPath})) |
| 627 | if err != nil { |
| 628 | t.Fatalf("read_file .env with protection off: %v", err) |
| 629 | } |
| 630 | if !strings.Contains(out, "PORT=8080") { |
| 631 | t.Fatalf("read_file dropped .env content:\n%s", out) |
| 632 | } |
| 633 | } |
| 634 | |
| 635 | func TestGlobFiltersSensitiveMatchesWhenProtected(t *testing.T) { |
| 636 | withProtectSensitiveFiles(t, true) |
| 637 | dir := t.TempDir() |
| 638 | if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, ".env"), []byte("SECRET_TOKEN=abc\n"), 0o600); err != nil { |
| 639 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 640 | } |
| 641 | if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "notes.txt"), []byte("ok"), 0o644); err != nil { |
| 642 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 643 | } |
| 644 | |
| 645 | g := globTool{} |
| 646 | out, err := g.Execute(context.Background(), argsJSON(t, map[string]any{"pattern": filepath.Join(dir, "*")})) |
| 647 | if err != nil { |
| 648 | t.Fatalf("glob: %v", err) |
| 649 | } |
| 650 | if strings.Contains(out, ".env") { |
| 651 | t.Fatalf("glob leaked sensitive match:\n%s", out) |
| 652 | } |
| 653 | if !strings.Contains(out, "notes.txt") { |
| 654 | t.Fatalf("glob dropped ordinary match:\n%s", out) |
| 655 | } |
| 656 | } |
| 657 | |
| 658 | // grep forbid-read |
| 659 | |
| 660 | func TestConfineReadBlocksGrepFile(t *testing.T) { |
| 661 | forbidDir := t.TempDir() |
| 662 | secretPath := filepath.Join(forbidDir, "secret.txt") |
| 663 | if err := os.WriteFile(secretPath, []byte("needle in a haystack"), 0o644); err != nil { |
| 664 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 665 | } |
| 666 | forbidRoots := realRoots([]string{forbidDir}) |
| 667 | g := grepTool{forbidRoots: forbidRoots} |
| 668 | args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"pattern": "needle", "path": secretPath}) |
| 669 | _, err := g.Execute(context.Background(), args) |
| 670 | if err == nil { |
| 671 | t.Error("grep on a forbid-read file should error, not return (no matches)") |
| 672 | } |
| 673 | var pathErr *os.PathError |
| 674 | if !errors.As(err, &pathErr) { |
| 675 | t.Errorf("grep forbid-read error should be *os.PathError, got %T: %v", err, err) |
| 676 | } |
| 677 | // Unconfined (nil forbidRoots) should work. |
| 678 | gUnconfined := grepTool{} |
| 679 | if out, err := gUnconfined.Execute(context.Background(), args); err != nil { |
| 680 | t.Errorf("unconfined grep should work: %v", err) |
| 681 | } else if out == "(no matches)" { |
| 682 | t.Error("unconfined grep should find the needle") |
| 683 | } |
| 684 | } |
| 685 | |
| 686 | func TestConfineReadBlocksNativeGrepDirectoryRoot(t *testing.T) { |
| 687 | root := t.TempDir() |
| 688 | forbidDir := filepath.Join(root, "secret") |
| 689 | secretPath := filepath.Join(forbidDir, "secret.txt") |
| 690 | if err := os.MkdirAll(forbidDir, 0o755); err != nil { |
| 691 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 692 | } |
| 693 | if err := os.WriteFile(secretPath, []byte("needle in a haystack"), 0o644); err != nil { |
| 694 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 695 | } |
| 696 | |
| 697 | g := grepTool{workDir: root, forbidRoots: realRoots([]string{forbidDir})} |
| 698 | out, err := g.Execute(context.Background(), argsJSON(t, map[string]any{"pattern": "needle", "path": "secret"})) |
| 699 | if err != nil { |
| 700 | t.Fatalf("grep forbidden directory should look empty, got error: %v", err) |
| 701 | } |
| 702 | if out != "(no matches)" { |
| 703 | t.Fatalf("grep forbidden directory = %q, want (no matches)", out) |
| 704 | } |
| 705 | } |
| 706 | |
| 707 | func TestConfineReadFiltersPlainGlobMatches(t *testing.T) { |
| 708 | root := t.TempDir() |
| 709 | forbidDir := filepath.Join(root, "secret") |
| 710 | if err := os.MkdirAll(forbidDir, 0o755); err != nil { |
| 711 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 712 | } |
| 713 | if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(forbidDir, "secret.go"), []byte("package secret\n"), 0o644); err != nil { |
| 714 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 715 | } |
| 716 | |
| 717 | g := globTool{workDir: root, forbidRoots: realRoots([]string{forbidDir})} |
| 718 | out, err := g.Execute(context.Background(), argsJSON(t, map[string]any{"pattern": "secret/*.go"})) |
| 719 | if err != nil { |
| 720 | t.Fatalf("glob forbidden directory: %v", err) |
| 721 | } |
| 722 | if out != "(no matches)" { |
| 723 | t.Fatalf("glob leaked forbidden paths:\n%s", out) |
| 724 | } |
| 725 | } |
| 726 |